This study investigates the phenomenon of fiscal illusion and its implications for progressive taxation in the context of retrospective voting. Fiscal illusion refers to the distortion of individuals' perception of the true cost of government services and the associated tax burden. Retrospective voting, on the other hand, refers to voters' tendency to base their electoral choices on the past performance of the government. The study examines how these two factors interact and influence the support for progressive taxation policies. By analyzing empirical data and employing economic and political theories, the study sheds light on the complexities of fiscal illusion and its impact on tax policy.

Fiscal illusion, progressive taxation, retrospective voting

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