Cognitive Mechanisms of Representing Evaluative Categories: Metaphor, Frame, Prototype

Abstract

This article explores how evaluative categories—those conveying judgments about desirability, moral worth, or social acceptability—are formed and maintained through three interrelated cognitive mechanisms: metaphor, frame, and prototype. Drawing from cognitive linguistic perspectives, it demonstrates that metaphors map characteristics from tangible or familiar domains onto abstract concepts, subtly shaping moral and aesthetic judgments. Frames situate these metaphors within culturally specific schemas, prompting socially shared interpretations and emotional reactions. Prototypes, which pivot around “best exemplars,” further guide category membership and evaluative significance by highlighting qualities that speakers regard as central. By illustrating how these processes intersect in discourse, the study underscores language’s active role in constructing and negotiating social values. It also highlights the fluid nature of evaluative categories in response to cultural shifts, technological change, and evolving norms. This analysis contributes to broader research on how language usage both mirrors and perpetuates collective perspectives, emphasizing the importance of studying metaphorical patterns, frames, and prototypes to uncover implicit value judgments in diverse communicative contexts.