COMPARING REALLOCATION MECHANISMS FOR PRIORITY QUEUING: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF TRADING PLACES
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.55640/jme-03-06-01Keywords:
Priority queuing, reallocation mechanisms, fairnessAbstract
This experimental study examines the effectiveness of different reallocation mechanisms in priority queuing systems. Priority queuing is a widely used approach to allocate resources based on priority levels in various domains. However, the choice of reallocation mechanism can significantly impact the fairness and efficiency of resource allocation. In this study, we compare three different reallocation mechanisms: First-Come-First-Serve (FCFS), Last-Come-First-Serve (LCFS), and Trading Places (TP). We conduct a series of experiments to evaluate the performance of these mechanisms in terms of fairness, average waiting time, and overall system efficiency. Our findings reveal that Trading Places outperforms both FCFS and LCFS in terms of fairness and average waiting time. Furthermore, Trading Places exhibits a higher level of system efficiency compared to the other two mechanisms. These results suggest that Trading Places can be a promising reallocation mechanism for priority queuing systems.
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Copyright (c) 2023 Anouar Onderstal
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