Independence of The Central Bank of The Republic of Uzbekistan, Confidence in Monetary Policy and The Effects of Increasing Foreign Direct Investment and Analysis

Authors

  • Mamasodiqov Salimbek G‘ofurjon o‘g‘li Fergana State University, Faculty of Economics, Economics major, 2nd year student, Uzbekistan

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.55640/eijps-06-03-20

Keywords:

Central bank independence, monetary policy credibility, foreign direct investment

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between central bank independence, monetary policy credibility, and foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows in Uzbekistan over the period 2010–2023. Drawing on inflation trajectory data, UNCTAD FDI statistics, and a comparative analysis with Georgia, this paper argues that the CBU’s institutional transition functioned as a macroeconomic credibility signal to foreign investors, contributing to a sustained increase in FDI inflows in the post-reform period. The analysis is descriptive and narrative in nature; no causal claims are advanced. The paper concludes that deepening CBU independence and communication transparency remain investment climate priorities, and calls for future panel econometric research to establish more rigorous causal identification.

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References

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Published

2026-03-31

How to Cite

Mamasodiqov Salimbek G‘ofurjon o‘g‘li. (2026). Independence of The Central Bank of The Republic of Uzbekistan, Confidence in Monetary Policy and The Effects of Increasing Foreign Direct Investment and Analysis. European International Journal of Philological Sciences, 6(03), 88–93. https://doi.org/10.55640/eijps-06-03-20