



## POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM WITH RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION IN THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND PALESTINE

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### ABOUT ARTICLE

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**Abstract:** Religion and governmental issues exist on a continuum with differing costs. Regardless of which domain holds power, the consequences for people's safety are the same. When religion is given complete authority, it is misused to legitimize violence. The sacred space of human history is denied the ability to thrive and sustain human communities if politics is completely empowered. However, regardless of whether the opportunity to control is absolute, neither side of the tension that exists in human society can completely resist the pull of power.

### INTRODUCTION

Hannah Arendt splendidly chronicled in her investigation of autocracy the way that political systems who characterize and control the presence of their subjects in outright utilitarian ways come to dodge the limit of those subjects to scrutinize state power, as well as the means by which they can then genuinely name what that power is.

Similar to what Christians have learned, Marc Ellis' writings on the remnants of the prophetic Jewish tradition following the events of 1948 and 1967 demonstrate that a religious tradition that comes to see itself through the eyes of the state has something wrong. He suggests that Christians have had to atone for the sins committed against Jews in the name of the Trinitarian God and ontological assumptions about the desirability of a "pure" or "efficient" culture, just as Jews have had to atone for the sins committed against Palestinians in the name of Judaism and the Zionist vision of a "secure" homeland.

In this examination, there are similitudes among Middle Easterners' and Jews' public desires and the office of a tight meaning of political character in the endeavor of building a public culture. Reconciliation or voluntarism toward the enemy (the ethno-cultural "Other") has not been deemed appropriate for the purposes of nation-building by either form of nationalism. Therefore, liberation theology's questions for people of good will have a broader scope, which has been demonstrated to be a historically significant boundary at which a religion and a government are both required to reevaluate

how they treat their members. This two-overlay evaluate that outgrows a philosophical investigation of one's socio-political setting, and the treacheries in that, lead one to inquire "freedom from what?" and "who should change?" In the interest of human society and the continuity of religious belief in the fragmented world of today, the gaze of the Other is turned back on the Self here.

While sociologists may discover that "in group" versus "out group" identities strengthen imagined communities, the question of value is whether those communities are "strong" or "weak" according to statistical matrices. Although few people are aware of the diversity of views and tradition of contested authority within Islam since its founding in the seventh century would consider it proof that truth is found in institutional strength alone, it is undeniable that a strong sense of belief and behavior is part of what creates the sense of certainty that leads many people around the world to convert to Islam.

## DISCUSSION

To comprehend the contention, it has been consequently important to take a complex, multi-disciplinary methodology that permits the characters at play to themselves be addressed, however much philosophy and verifiable story they convey.

In the present setting, it is frequently from one's own that one is banished, as learned people and scholars reject customs whose classifications are contradictory with the divided and complex world in which they live, or who look for a "great" more expansive than personal responsibility would permit. While the overlapping identities of Jews and Palestinians are not merely semantic or superficial, there are numerous boundaries that can divide people. When it comes to balancing religion and politics in the 20th and 21st centuries, it is abundantly clear that only authenticity can lay the groundwork for long-term solutions, even if that means leaving one's own culture.

For those who believe that Palestinians mean revolution and the end of the Israeli state, this ethical definition of "liberation" may appear naive. These individuals would silence Arab Israelis and the global leadership of the Palestinian National Council, implying that the Palestinian establishment does not accurately represent the current state of Palestine. These pessimistic critics point to the actions of the armed opposition groups, particularly those whose religious context suggests that Jewish security is easily opposed. As a result, transnational, economic, and military negotiations must revolve around a single, unreliable aspect of Palestinian identity that has been codified in Western eyes. To put it plainly, it is a thistle in the side of the socialized world.

Despite the fact that it relies on the support of the Arab and international communities for its desire for self-determination and a better future, it is silenced at diplomatic levels. U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, for instance, do not address the Palestinian people as a whole; rather, they only address the burden that Palestinian refugees place on their Arab hosts (Ashrawi, 1992).

In addition, those who disagree with their analysis claim that it is too pro-Palestinian (Shainin, 2002). Edward Said establishes a view of human relations in which the issue is one of representation. As a result, intellectuals of all stripes are plagued by a creative but unsolvable conflict between theory and practice.

Politically, the only option is for the government to act only insofar as it creates a fair foundation from which a just peace can emerge organically or internally, with a courageous commitment to its members' democratic capacity. This implies that citizens have a responsibility—not just a right—to uphold an idealistic pragmatism that is both radically optimistic and skeptically wise regarding the context and nature of power in the intellectual climate of the twenty-first century. According to Hannah Arendt, this is a difficult task that, at its core, necessitates the ability to reason and make fair judgments about oneself and others. In her essay "The Crisis in Culture," she argued that "The power of judgment

rests on a potential agreement with others," and that "the thinking process that is active in judging something is not, like the thought process of pure reasoning, a dialogue between me and myself." Instead, "the thinking process that is active in judging something finds itself always and primarily in an anticipated communication with others with whom I know I must finally come to some agreement," even when I am quite alone in making up my mind." And this expanded way of thinking, which is able to transcend its own limitations as judgment, cannot function in complete solitude or isolation; It never has the opportunity to operate at all without the presence of others "in whose place" it must think and consider their point of view (Arendt, 1992).

While Lévinas, like Wiesel, Walzer, Ozick, and others, does not demand the same universal treatment for Palestinians as Jews have for their post-Holocaust identity when the two clash, he serves as a reminder of a broader, "universal" dimension of human relations toward the problem of power that does not take lightly the excuses of historical context. Howard Caygill, a British professor of cultural history, identified the tension that Lévinas was able to alleviate: The problem arises when political logic would favor greater peace and justice while holy history would encourage war-provocative attitudes and behaviors. (Caygill, 2002).

Caygill's in-depth analysis of Lévinas' political thought reveals an incongruent dissonance between his ethics, which are based on a universal call for justice, and his politics, which are based on the Jews' "holy" obligation to survive at any cost. In a manner that is analogous to Hannah Arendt and other multi-disciplinary philosophers, Lévinas argues that religion provides for humanity a sense of universality and its gravity within history. Despite this, intellectual life has continued into the twenty-first century, in contrast to the (rhetorical or not) belief that God is dead and that history ended after the Holocaust.

The intellectual must now place herself squarely within the realm of the non-intellectual—the "organic" intellectual, to use Antonio Gramsci's terms—and imagine a new Mind and Heart life that is relevant in this fractured, post-structural world in which one is simultaneously aware of the past and the future. Jewish writings on the prophetic tradition show that Western intellectual thought has changed over time but has kept its focus on its roots. In any case, they additionally show the trouble in seeing external oneself, compared as they are against the severe real factors that emerge when one doesn't. They do this to emphasize the importance of community and a sense of solidarity beyond the coincidence of geography and identity's privilege.

How might justice be carried out and for whom should judgment exist in the space between prophecy, speculation, and disinterest, as Arendt defined it earlier? For many, Judaism is all about caring about the suffering of others. However, there is a growing consensus that Israeli policies are an exception to this rule. As a result, they are more than just a blind spot in contemporary Jewish commentary or Western intellectual thought; rather, they are the very thing that makes Judaism successful. The writings of Ellis and Ateek demonstrate that belief in the authenticity of the rabbinical and prophetic traditions within Judaism—as well as the authenticity of the contemporary Christian witness—is impossible if they are unable to search their own depths and provide an explanation for the injustice they have sought, committed, and ignored (Prager, 1975), despite the fact that belief in God is difficult after Auschwitz. The lived reality of Palestinians forces one to reconsider their role in establishing a just peace in today's political economy, regardless of the justification for the exclusion of non-Jews or suspicion of self-sufficiency.

Are these unreasonable worries? They discuss the jigsaw of factors that contribute to identity differentiation and legitimize violence. In the modern era, they challenge the power imbalance and the expectation that one people's nationalism is superior to another's. A future that would serve as a

foundation for renewal and learning, reconciliation, and self-examination is conceivable for Jews, Muslims, and Christians in Israel and Palestine, independent of the bankrupt and stymied pattern of diplomatic resolutions and theoretical projections.

The splendor of liberal majority rule government, as it has arisen in the American undertaking through the pliant yet unavoidably unmistakable perspective on statehood and everything strict, is to a great extent because of its protecting of strict imperativeness and individual voluntarism. Even though Christianity is still deeply ingrained in American culture, there is no legal protection or privilege for it. Judaism, be that as it may, faces a vastly different game plan with the province of Israel, a self-proclaimed "Jewish," "vote based" state. Political theorists have had to turn around to find a definition of democracy that defies both European liberalism's norm and practice and allows one ethnic or religious group to be prioritized over others without undoing the statehood project as a whole.

According to John Bunzl (2002), Israeli sociologist Moshe Zuckerman claims that the direction of Israeli political culture is dependent on a "false consciousness" in whichby Israeli selfhood has been based on a manipulation of guilt and anxiety toward others—namely, Holocaust survivors, indigenous Palestinians, and ultra-Orthodox Jews, or the three largest "out-groups" of Israeli society. This claim seems to have implications for American social stratification as well. Similar to Ellis, he asserts that a radical de-Zionistization of Israeli policy and political procedure is the only way to overcome the marginalization of these outgroups from a secular sociological perspective. His vision not just implodes the breaks inside Israeli society and the Jewish people group around the world, so that non-perceptive, non-Ashkenazi, as well as non-American Jews are acknowledged completely inside another picture of Israel. It also provides a foundation for non-Jews, regardless of their specific ethnic or religious background, to participate as equals and non-outsiders in the development of the state of Israel. This raises the question of why an outsider would want to live in Israel and identify as an Israeli.

The goal of a democracy is to give all citizens equal opportunities. It is the inevitable, albeit contradictory, outcome of a national conflict. However, when Israelis talk about peace, they still mean that there will be no more open violence and that Jews will be protected from outside attacks by non-Jews. When Palestinians talk about peace, they mean procedural justice, food security, protection from midnight raids, no more helicopter reprisals, and an end to occupation. In other words, they mean that open violence will stop and that non-Palestinians won't attack their people from outside. Israelis request harmony before Palestinians can have the political acknowledgment they pine for, yet Palestinians are supposed to accomplish a vote based system before they have opportunity and public sway. However, neither party talks about "peace" beyond the outsider. At a point not long from now, if and when occupation finishes and Palestinian public goals accomplish suitable statehood, the discussion should turn internal toward interior social union and compromise with the "outsider inside thy doors" (Borowitz, 1990).

On the American side, it should be asked at what value the pervasive Christian worldview go on in America even beyond by right techniques and who it is that really endures its fallouts. Outreaching and fundamentalist worries over the secularization and against Christian predisposition of American culture are questionable to the extent that the favorable to Israeli inclination of American international strategy producers and the developing enemy of Muslim inclination of the overall American public is encouraged by Christian authors and scholars. It is easy to argue that American Christians have an obligation to include the plight of Eastern, Palestinian Christians in their list of suffering and persecution. However, as the trajectory of Judaism in Europe, America, and the Middle East in the twentieth century demonstrates, this would only evade the true scale of change that is required. Is the

issue in the use of Christianity as opposed to its presence, or must American culture go through an extremist and all out de-Christianization process before equity can be looked for Muslims and non-American Jews and Christians the same?

The project of moral judgment has no geographical or historical boundaries and must logically begin with oneself before any other individual. That is to say, the term "liberation," as we have used it, refers to its "oppressive" counterpart. Globalization has just assisted the limits of these terms and the stakes for which the discussion proceeds. Is the experience of Israel and Palestine, like that of the Balkans, the untold story of liberalism, or have their people and aspirations been left behind by contemporary liberalism? Muslim clerical orders for suicide bombings, as well as the subjective experience of Jews and Christians, should never be used to silence moral judgment. However, many Israelis, particularly the religiously observant, view Israel as a state that fulfills the covenantal obligation of Jews to "live as a community whose life was structured by God's Torah," rather than as oppressive (Ibid.). Disagreeing Jews shift the responsibility for justice from the people to the tradition, which is not surprising. Is the Covenant, as it has been handed down through the ages, receptive to the wisdom gleaned from living as outsiders in exile? Does the Jewish Covenant's story of righteousness appropriately conclude with Jews? As Ellis asks, do the present "Jews" — the Palestinians — make a difference to the Jewish Pledge not to mention the American constitution?

Because of the internal dynamics and diversity of human behavior as well as the limited external access one has to the experiences of others, even those with whom one is intimate, relationships are imbued with unpredictability and concealment. As with the call for pacifism or active resistance to the impulse of war, Christian groups respond in a variety of doctrinal and social ways to the issue of political power and the use of violence. With regards to Israel and Palestine, the most fascinating and bifurcation is inside every local area, instead of between them. Palestinian Christians serve as both witnesses of Palestine and Christianity at a singular crossroads—or perhaps a precipice. They struggle not with identifying the issue, but rather with responding to the "immediate evil" they and their parishioners face every day without escalating political tensions with Israel or ignoring the spiritual requirements of the populace or their material responsibilities as church administrators. Nussbaum, 1999).

She finds that Woolfe's portrayal of the Ramsay family offers a thought-provoking perspective on society as a whole and current events worldwide. The reader, in particular, finds a foothold for compassion and is able to imagine change through the free-verse of the character's inner thoughts. In other words, the reader is able to comprehend and take into account the particulars of each other's lives as well as their surroundings, as well as imagine a way for their paths to align and forgiveness to prevail (Woolf, 1927).

As the observant reader, we are able to see signals of future events even before they occur, despite the fact that these are frequently ignored or misinterpreted by the characters themselves. Each encounter is filled from the beginning with possibilities that blossom and fade through dialogue, inaction, and distraction.

Such a story piece on the human psyche and its capacity to comprehend past itself straightforwardly embodies the undertaking I see vital for practical and savvy change in Israel-Palestine — that is, a future worth battling for. Indeed "individuals of generosity," as Nussbaum says, could undoubtedly separate or surrender in dissatisfaction, regretting business as usual and sticking to their disdain of the hornet's home that they suspect in the other's brain, as it were. However, moral judgment cannot be so limited. Jews, Christians, and Muslims will only be able to develop and implement the prophetic spirituality required to critique society and move forward if we pay careful

attention to the people and environment around us and have a determinedly broad perspective on social justice. The people of Israel and Palestine cannot have a divorce because, even if Palestine becomes an independent state, there will always be some overlap in areas like airspace rights, labor resources, religious sites, and theological commentary.

Whether secular Jews versus religious Jews, Muslim versus Christian Palestinians versus Israelis, or Palestinians versus Israelis, each national and religious group is better able to recognize the good in its alleged adversary as it comes to recognize the contradictions of its own identity. In addition, each gathering should perceive the way that — for other people — the outrageous perspectives inside its gathering frequently come to address something fundamental about its character (Javadikouchaksaraei et al., 2016). Because of this, rather than voices from outside the group, "the better angels" within that group are best positioned to challenge the ideology and interests behind atrocity. Can the United States exert pressure on Israel to alter its policies of closing, military incursions, extrajudicial assassination, and other similar actions? Can the public and the electorate exert pressure to prevent the reintroduction of those policies elsewhere?

Cornel West, an American social historian and public intellectual, challenged the United States' justification for its "preemptive" mobilization in front of a packed hotel ballroom in downtown Washington, DC, two months after the United States declared war on Iraq in March 2003—long before the fallout from its miscalculations and abuses against political prisoners became common discourse in America. He contended that the public authority's thinking was foolish and nonsensical, and that its impact was, to some degree, cover and legitimization for Israel's cases of "preplanned" security through unwarranted house tear-downs and unlawful invasions into Palestinian region. West argued that the United States' efforts to eradicate terrorism were precisely those that would impede the internal or natural development of democracy, leading to the very instability it sought to avoid.

When one considers Israel's approach to containing Palestinian resentment since the first intifada, almost two decades ago, the West's critique of this preemptive foreign policy is not that novel. It outlined three types of courage that are necessary to support any project of social transformation: 1) the Socratic courage to confront oneself, one's society, and the world around them with difficult questions; 2) the prophetic bravery to show compassion and accept suffering as true; and 3) the democratic bravery required to hold dogma and ideology accountable to actual life and experiences (Nussbaum, 1997).

A group of Jews, Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, and others who claimed to be both "pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian" were in West's audience when he delivered his critique. They also believed that the American war would lead to a power struggle and ingrained violence between Israelis and Palestinians; In a similar vein, they believed that a deeper spiritual malaise was the cause of both conflicts' abrasiveness and political rhetoric (Lerner, 2003).

The theologies of liberation that we have examined in this thesis, including those of Naim Ateek, Marc Ellis, Gustavo Gutierrez, Rosemary Radford Ruether, and others, were rooted in the same prophetic tradition that West spoke from. Like these essayists' call to reconceive the Sacred writings for the benefit of poor people and the underestimated, West's three-overlay challenge endeavors to reconceive — that is, to re-sharpen and de-enrapture — political discussion in circumstances of contention, each individual in turn. He argues that critical thinking, inclusive compassion, and a democratic spirit can accomplish this (Robinson, 2002).

The contention in Israel-Palestine clearly connects with the American body politic to the extent that America upholds Israel monetarily. It appears to be that globalized economies mean essentially an

expansion of financial reliance — from the Palestinians on Israel's economy to Israel's on the American economy, even to America's reliance on Saudi Arabia's economy as far as our lopsided oil creation and utilization designs. What alternative paradigm for change might America bring to the table and/or impose upon the parties if the core of the conflict is indeed political and economic, as opposed to religious or ethnic? This is similar to what Britain did with the idea of partition in 1948.

According to Bishara (2003), the premise of the Bush Administration's "Road Map" is that genuine reconciliation between political and social groups will only occur when it is mutually implemented.

## CONCLUSION

We've talked about how structural parity through statehood and citizenship, which comes with statehood, is just one part of the project to make Israel and Palestine live in peace. For both the extremes of Palestinian and Israeli society, the ideology and ingrained interests that a legitimate atrocity must be challenged if change is to occur. It is alienating and ultimately a bad policy for unity within a national group, let alone peace with its neighbors, to manipulate the public good through ideology, language, and symbolic artifacts—including holiday rituals, national myths, architecture, and even geography itself—as well as other cultural practices. When religious language is used to boost political legitimacy, as Sharon, Arafat, and many others have done, it cannot be sustained unless the values reflected in that language are implemented. The inclusive vision of the Israeli Declaration of Independence belies the genuineness of Israel's democracy and does not eliminate the reality of racism in Israeli society. Neediness, obliviousness, and moral separation between ethnic or strict gatherings should be gone after if way of talking and the norm are to give way to straightforwardness and genuine compromise.

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