



A Look at The Military Aggression of The Soviet Union to Afghanistan (December 1979-February 1989)

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Abstract: The Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 is considered one of the most important political and military events in the contemporary history of Afghanistan as well as the Cold War era. This event not only turned Afghanistan into a proxy war scene between the superpowers of the East and the West; rather, it left extensive effects on regional and global security and stability. The importance and necessity of this research lies in examining the internal and external roots of this aggression, analyzing its consequences and understanding its long-term effects on the political, social and economic structures of Afghanistan and the region. The purpose of this research is to provide an analysis of the Soviet military aggression against Afghanistan. The findings of this research show that the internal political instability, the internal differences of the Afghan People's Democratic Party and the Soviet effort to maintain its geopolitical influence in the region were the main reasons for this aggression. Also, the consequences of this aggression included massive human casualties, the destruction of Afghanistan's infrastructure, and the increase in the influence of Mujahideen forces, the effects of which remained noticeable even decades later. On the other hand, this war played an important role in weakening the Soviet Union and its final collapse. The conclusion of this research emphasizes that foreign military interventions, regardless of the internal conditions of the target country, instead of achieving political goals, lead to instability and deeper crises. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is one of the outstanding examples of the failure of development policies, which is not only for the

attacking country; It also had devastating consequences for the target country.

Keywords: Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Cold War, People's Democratic Party, political instability, consequences.

Introduction: The contemporary history of the world is full of wars and military interventions, which each of those has left a deep impact on the involved countries and international relations. The military invasion of the "Soviet Union" - which is referred to as the Soviet in the text of this article - to Afghanistan, which began in December 1979, is one of the most prominent examples of such interventions, which had wide-ranging and multilateral consequences. This event not only led to fundamental changes in the political and social structure of Afghanistan, but also turned into a battlefield for the Cold War between the two superpowers of that time, the United States and the Soviet Union. The Afghanistan war, as one of the longest and most expensive proxy wars of the 20th century, is particularly important in the history of international relations.

Before the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan was dealing with a series of internal and external crises. Internal differences between different political factions, government instability, and foreign interference provided the ground for Soviet military aggression in this country. The April 27, 1978 coup and the establishment of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was one of the turning points that intensified the internal crises. The Soviet Union, which sought to expand its influence in the region for years, decided to intervene militarily when the then Afghan government was on the verge of collapse. This intervention, which took place with the claim of supporting the legal government and dealing with internal rebellions; But in practice, it became one of the most important symbols of Soviet ambition during the Cold War.

On the other hand, the consequences of this aggression were not only limited to Afghanistan, but also affected the region and the world. This war greatly intensified the geopolitical competition between the Eastern and Western blocs and played an important role in the weakening and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. Inside Afghanistan, this military intervention led to the beginning of a long and bloody war that not only left millions dead and displaced, but also severely destroyed the country's economic and social infrastructure.

In this article, an attempt is made to explain the internal and external factors of this intervention by examining the historical, social and political contexts of the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan. Also, its consequences will be analyzed at different national, regional and global levels. By using reliable sources and historical analysis, an attempt is made to provide a comprehensive and multifaceted picture of this event that can help to better understand its causes and consequences.

Historical background of the research subject

Regarding the view of the Soviet military aggression in Afghanistan, there have been brief and scattered discussions in the history books that need to be developed. In books like; "Afghan-Soviet war; The cause of the global collapse of communism", by Amir Etimad Danishyar, "The Afghan Jihad and the Cold War of the Great Powers" by Mohammad Ibrahim Varsaji, "A look at the causes and contexts of the Soviet military aggression in Afghanistan" by Mohammad Youssef Sharifi, "The Soviet invasion and defeat in Afghanistan" by Saadat Moluk Tabesh Heravi, "Afghanistan, the Soviet aggression and the Mujahideen resistance" by Henry Bradshir, "The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan; Coup, Sovereignty and Collapse" by Mohammad Akram Andishmand, "A brief look at the contemporary history of Afghanistan" by Mohammad Ebrahim Ataei, etc. Some brief hints have been made in this regard, which have been thoroughly and comprehensively discussed in this article.

The general situation of Afghanistan on the eve of Soviet military aggression

After the victory of the coup on May 31, 1978, instead of the Military Council, the Revolutionary Council announced a new government. The Revolutionary Council, which was formed for the leadership of the coup, appointed Noor Mohammad Taraki as the head of the Revolutionary Council, Sadr Azam and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, and Babrak Karmal as the same. He chose posts as his deputy and chose the members of the cabinet from the combination of the members of both factions (People's faction). During the administration period of Noor Mohammad Taraki, the Russians were also able to keep this privilege for themselves, that since the period of Shah Amanullah, they have always recognized the governments of Afghanistan as official compared to other countries. During the first days of the coup, the KGB in Kabul, on the orders of Moscow, took active measures to obtain the archives of the Ministry of Interior and Defense and the Presidency (AGSA), which had been renamed. For these operations, they used their relatives who held a

high position in the Afghan intelligence service (Sharifi, 1402: 41).

Hafizullah Amin left for Moscow on December 3, 1978, along with a high-ranking delegation headed by Noor Mohammad Taraki, after removing his political rivals (Parcham faction) and appointing people loyal to him instead. Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev warmly welcomed the Afghan delegation, and the day after the delegation arrived in Moscow, Noor Mohammad Taraki, in his speech to the Soviet leader, approved the country's policy on the Pashtun issue and on the 5th of December of the same year, Noor Mohammad Taraki signed the agreement of Hasan Hamjavari with Brezhnev in the Kremlin, which Moscow used as a document to invade Afghanistan one year later. Although the Soviets were not obliged to prevent the fall of the new communist regime in Afghanistan according to the articles of the agreement; But they were preparing in advance to save this regime from failure and to keep Afghanistan under their influence, even if this is possible through the use of military forces if necessary (Sistani, 2000: 95).

The visit of Noor Mohammad Taraki from Moscow brought two other signs that showed that Afghanistan is moving towards the Soviet axis. One is that it was summarized in the joint declaration that the contacts between the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will further develop, and the other is that at the same time the contract for the establishment of a permanent commission was signed. An economic cooperation agreement was signed between the two governments. From a number of specific economic agreements that were signed later, it was known that the strengthening of various aspects of Afghanistan's economy depended on the Soviet economy, and this principle led to the real domination of Afghanistan's economy by The Soviet Union.

With the coup of April 27, 1978, the foreign policy of Afghanistan changed from the foundation. The foreign policy that was designed and implemented by Afghans themselves before the establishment of the People's Democratic Party, this policy was designed in Moscow and handed over to the leaders of the Afghan government for implementation. Another political line of Moscow should be followed and applied (Mobarez, 1390: 405).

In this order, the Soviets and their intelligence apparatus (KGB) found an open hand in both internal affairs and foreign policies, and in all ministries and other departments, Russian advisers were appointed and had complete control over affairs. They did at the same time,

Hafizullah Amin chased his opponents (Parcham faction) from all government and military positions or imprisoned them. This method of Hafizullah Amin soon made the level of his supporters heavier against those of Noor Mohammad Taraki, and as a result, two groups (Taraki supporters and Amin supporters) came into power within the party. The Soviet plan, based on preserving the relationship and cooperating with Noor Mohammad Taraki to replace Hafizullah Amin, collapsed. This incident provided the worst possible result for the Soviets. The rule of Hafizullah Amin by removing the power from Noor Muhammad Taraki increased, and Hafizullah Amin's hatred of the Soviets made cooperation to solve the needs that both sides needed in the future a problem (Bradshir, 1378: 138).

Noor Mohammad Taraki, who had traveled to Havana, the capital of Cuba, to participate in the meeting of non-aligned countries; after entering the presidential office, he called the members of the party's political committee to report on his trip. The meeting of the political committee started and before Noor Mohammad Taraki presented his travel report, some of his fans suggested that Hafizullah Amin should answer the political committee about the conspiracy he arranged to kill Noor Mohammad Taraki. Hafizullah Amin also pointed to the conspiracy that was planned against him by Noor Mohammad Taraki, and then he left the meeting and the others also returned to their workplaces. Now, the discords between Noor Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin was revealed. Hafizullah Amin took the initiative and on the evening of September 13, 1979, he announced the dismissal of three of the fans of Taraki. These three people were Defense Minister Islam Watanjar, Communications Minister Seyed Mohammad Gulabzoi, Interior Minister Shirjan Mazdooriyar, and AGSA President Asdullah Sarwari, who was considered one of Noor Mohammad Taraki's staunch supporters. After this, Hafizullah Amin boldly ordered to transfer Noor Mohammad Taraki from the citadel harem to Koti Bagche, which is one of the most beautiful buildings of Amir Abdul-Rahman Khan and connected to the harem. Noor Mohammad Taraki spent some time there with his wife, and three weeks later on October 8 or 9 of the same year, because none of the fans came to him, he was suffocated by Amin's order with a pillow and was buried in Kul-Abechkan next to his brother's grave. The news of Taraki's death was published on the last page of the Kabul newspaper as a worthless and insignificant news, and his grave was opened one night after his burial by unknown people and his body was set on fire. In this way, the student prevailed over the master and he relied on the strength of the master (Sistani, 2000: 125).

It should be noted that the Soviet Union, which was

taken aback by the murder of Noor Mohammad Taraki, was the first country to congratulate Hafizullah Amin's government without any reaction, and without the change of its ambassador from Kabul, which Hafizullah Amin had requested. He accepted the delay and instead sent a Tatar person named Fekrat Tabif as the new ambassador to Kabul.

Factors of Soviet military aggression in Afghanistan

Internal factors

Hafizullah Amin took charge of all government affairs by himself after examining Noor Mohammad Taraki inside the presidential palace on September 14, 1979. After gaining power, Hafizullah Amin's first act was to announce the death of Noor Mohammad Taraki on October 9, 1979; While he had killed him at the beginning of his rule, the hope of his comrades was cut off with the death of Noor Mohammad Taraki, and Hafizullah Amin imprisoned many of his supporters and killed many of them in a tragic way. At the beginning of Hafizullah Amin's rule, Soviet send their congratulations through Pozanov, the ambassador of that country in Kabul. But Hafizullah Amin expelled Ablouf, a member of that country's embassy, from Kabul. In a meeting, the Soviet ambassador criticized Hafizullah Amin for violating diplomatic regulations. Hafizullah Amin, who was very angry on him, slapped the ambassador and informed the Soviet to call up Pozanov and send another person in his place. The Soviet also called Pozanov to the Soviet and instead of him, he sent Fikret Ahmad Janovitch Tabiov as an ambassador, who planned the death of Amin at his hands (Ataei, 1399: 416).

Hafizullah Amin did not deal well with the Soviets in the first days of his government, for example, once his discussions with the Soviet delegation about the price of gas reached such an extent that he told them: "If you accept the price that we have set and it is the same as the international regulations, it is good, otherwise this contract will be canceled completely, Afghanistan will do its transfers by donkeys and betake the benefit of the gas." Although he became very soft against the Soviets later; But the Soviets did not believe him. Hafizullah Amin knew that the Soviets planned to overthrow his regime. Therefore, he referred to America and Pakistan; but the conditions developed in such a way that it was already too late to return his relations with the Russians to their normal form. One hundred and three days of Hafizullah Amin's leadership in the People's Democratic Party and his party government were accompanied by the Soviet-friendship cry and emphasis on this friendship and loyalty to the Soviet system and ideology. When the Soviet representatives talked to Hafizullah Amin after

the explanations given by Shah Wali Khan, the foreign minister of the government of Hafizullah Amin on October 6, 1979, about the dismissal of Noor Mohammad Taraki, and they stated that the enemies of Afghanistan's friendship with the Soviets will take advantage from Shah Wali's explanations. Amin said to them: "...don't be afraid, let the people of Washington come and see for themselves that they can't make a breach in our friendship, our enemies are desperate, because they have no hope anymore. I promise that we will move towards communism. There should not be any concern about the friendship and brotherhood of the Soviet and Afghan people and the communist parties of the two countries." (Andishmand, 2009: 275).

Hafizullah Amin's relations and relationships during his short government were not limited only to Soviet friendly cries and emotional expressions. In this period, despite his calls and efforts to establish relations with the United States of America and Pakistan, Hafizullah Amin responded positively to all Soviet requests. He warmly welcomed the Soviet military and security delegation, who were incessantly coming and going to Afghanistan during the one hundred and three day government. He did not impose any conditions and restrictions and the uninterrupted arrival of the Soviet military and security authorities. He opened his ears to hear any advice from the Soviets. He accepted the advice of the Soviet representatives and Russian advisers in moving his office and headquarters from the presidential palace to the Taj Beig hill palace in Dar al-Aman. He agreed to the entry of the military units of the Red Army, which were defined as limited units. In response to the message of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev and Alexander Kasgin on the occasion of the first anniversary of the agreement of December 5, 1978, between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, he spoke about the importance and value of this agreement in the expansion of relations between the two countries and the ban of the Soviet Union on The agreement and the implementation of the articles contained in the agreement by the Soviet government expressed its gratitude and pleasure. A few days later, Hafizullah Amin said that the Soviet will apply the provisions of the agreement exactly and without deviation. He expressed the same questions about the Soviet agreement (the agreement of December 5, 1978) three weeks before the soldiers of that country killed him (Andishmand, 2009: 278).

Hafizullah Amin, who has been mistrusting the Soviets for a long time and was trying to secretly open the way of reconciliation with America and Pakistan and reconcile with the Mujahideen of Afghanistan, in order to prevent the Soviets from directly dominating Afghanistan. Hafizullah Amin was trying to be close to

America; because he did not have diplomatic experience and skills, he resorted to destructive and scattered measures, which probably destroyed its success. The Americans, who did not trust his honesty nor his skills and competence, ignored his appeals. While, at the end of November 1979, Archerblad was sent to Kabul and Hafizullah Amin met him; but again, the American government did not take his request seriously and did not cooperate with his government (Farhang, 1390: 1015).

In the end, Yuri Andropov and other people close to Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev decided to kill Hafizullah Amin and use the military forces to establish an obedient leader in Kabul. Fear of (KGB) from Hafizullah Amin was not the only reason for the military invasion to Afghanistan; rather, the disturbance of the fall of the ruling regime in Kabul was another motivation for this decision. If the Soviet military forces were not sent, the government system would fall apart due to the joining of its people as opponents. If communism was to be preserved in Afghanistan, Moscow must act decisively; however, the KGB's negative perception of Hafizullah Amin played a major role in accelerating their military invasion of Afghanistan and forcing the members of the party's political committee to do this. The Soviet Political Committee on November 26, 1979, that is, five days after the attack by members of the Jamaat-e-Islami on the American Embassy in Islamabad-Pakistan and three weeks after the hostage-taking of the members of the American Embassy by Iranian students in Tehran decided to attack Afghanistan (Kol, 1389: 48).

The influence and control of the Soviets on the Afghan army and security apparatus during Hafizullah Amin's rule expanded more than in the past. These relations progressed until Hafizullah Amin's acceptance and welcoming of the Red Army's entry into Afghanistan, and the parts that Hafizullah Amin demanded to be kept by him and his government. Contrary to his expectations and wishes, these forces killed Hafizullah Amin himself and overthrew his government.

Despite all this, the words that Hafizullah Amin used to express in public in order to attract the attention of the Russians, did not convince the Russians that they have close relations and mutual support from his government. Because of his secret relationship with Pakistan and America and his meetings with western political figures, he made a plan to remove Hafizullah Amin very soon. On December 27, 1979, Soviet military planes landed one after the other at Kabul and Bagram military airports, and other Soviet forces that had passed through the ports of Hayratan and Torghoundi two days before, moved to Herat, Kandahar, Ghazni and Kabul (Ataei, 1399: 424). The choice of the exact

date for sending Soviet military forces to Afghanistan, America's preoccupation with the issue of hostage taking of the members of that country's embassy in Tehran, which began in November 1979, and the Western world's preoccupation with New Year's Eve was also not without influence. Victor Paputin visited Kabul on November 28, 1979, he was responsible for forcing Hafizullah Amin to invite an unlimited number of Soviet military forces to Afghanistan without restrictions and conditions so that with these forces Hafizullah Amin's government could confront with his opponents. Victor Paputin succeeded to get permission to move certain groups of Soviet forces in Bagram, Salang and Kabul airport. The mentioned used this permission to bring the special units of the Soviet forces to Kabul (Farhang, 1390: 1018). By the dawn of December 27, 1979, hundreds of Soviet troops entered Kabul and Bagram airport by hundreds of air flights; Also, the armored forces that had crossed the Amu River and were on their way to Kabul on the 4th of the same year, entered the capital.

The Soviet advisers pretended that the arrival of these forces was a military exercise in the parts of the Afghan army. There was no state of emergency and serious concern within the government in Kabul. Hafizullah Amin was the host of the members of the political office of the People's Democratic Party that day noon at Tape-Taj-Beg Palace, and he made a statement on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the founding of the People's Democratic Party and the meeting with Tawakkel Tabif. And he appreciated their help.

Hafizullah Amin was assuring the members of the political office of the People's Democratic Party of military and financial aid from the Soviet Union, whose Soviet cook was busy with poisoning his food in the kitchen, and the Soviet forces were outside the presidential palace, preparing for a military operation to overthrow his government. The plan to poison Hafizullah Amin was taken by the Group of Eight (KGB) under the leadership of Yuri Andropov. That group brought Talibf to Hafizullah Amin's palace as a cook. While the plan to poison Hafizullah Amin by his Soviet cook was successfully implemented at noon on December 27 of the same year, and Hafizullah Amin went into a coma after having lunch. The Soviet doctors, not knowing about the program of overthrowing operations, brought him to consciousness until the beginning of the operations (Andishmand, 2009: 292). On December 27th of the same year, when Hafizullah Amin was still in the anesthesia bed and his condition was improving, the operations to his place of residence (Tajbeg Hill Palace) started with shooting bullets. More than 700 members (KGB) from the center and its surrounding areas were deployed in Kabul to participate

in the operations. The soldiers put on the uniform of the Afghan army and went into action to overthrow Hafizullah Amin's government and dominate the situation. Meanwhile, the 333rd strike unit (KGB) had targeted the presidential palace and wanted Hafizullah Amin to surrender. According to his wife's speech, his family members did not know who the attackers were. After the siege of the palace, the Soviet forces suggested to Hafizullah Amin's guard that they surrender, but the guard resisted and as a result, there was a fight between the two sides, which extended to the inside of the palace. After crushing the resistance, the Soviet forces soon entered the palace and immediately shot the children and women living there. One of the attackers, who was holding a picture of Hafizullah Amin, pointed at him. In this way, with the killing of Hafizullah Amin, his one hundred and three day government period was ended (Moradi, 1394: 374).

Although the Afghan army was unhappy with the performance of Hafizullah Amin in the merciless killing of his family members and countrymen, and they were thinking of opportunities to take revenge from this regime, and the current situation was shrouded in uncertainty, but they did not do a serious job of defending Hafizullah Amin's regime. In this order, the Soviets entered Afghanistan and appointed Babrak Karmal as the ruler of the country instead of Hafizullah Amin. By attacking on Afghanistan, the Soviets had long-term political plans in mind. In the beginning, they sought to establish a pro-Soviet and communist-minded regime in Afghanistan. Then, this regime prevented the spread of Islamic parties and movements in Afghanistan, which were against the interests of the Soviet Union. Because Afghanistan could become an effective military base for more Soviet access to its facilities in Abyssinia and South Yemen (Rahmand, 1392: 284).

Regional factors

The geographical location of Afghanistan in the region and the lack of a strong and centralized government in this country from the distant past have turned this land into a field of competition between the great powers. Afghanistan is located in the sensitive and strategic regions of Central Asia. On the one hand, it is related to the Indian subcontinent and on the other hand, to the Central Asian countries and the People's Republic of China, and in the same way, it is related to the West and the Middle East Asia, which therefore plays the role of a communication bridge between these regions. Despite all this, this country does not have access to the open waters of the world and access to these waters is through the countries of Iran and Pakistan (Mohammadi, 1389: 14).

Since the time of the tsars, the Russians have been thinking of progressing and occupying the land of non-Russian lands. After the revolution of October 1917 and the formation of the Soviet Union, they entered the stage of encroachment on other lands. According to the progressive policy they had in the region, the Soviets wanted to take over the vast areas of India through Afghanistan, and at the same time, through Afghanistan, they came close to Iran, through this way to the Persian Gulf and The sea of Oman has gained control and the pulse of the region's power, and have dominion and control over the oil of this region (Andishmand, 2009: 220).

Although Afghanistan is in an onshore location; But its geographical location has caused this country to enjoy a suitable strategic location; Therefore, the appropriate and sensitive geographical location of this land has caused regional superpowers to always pay special attention to it and always intervene in its political and internal affairs and take the political stability of this country into their own hands. Another reason for Soviet military aggression and domination of Afghanistan was to create an important and solid base for its political influence in Asia and the Middle East, to establish regimes dependent on it in the region and protect them, as well as to confront Islamic movements in the Middle-East, India subcontinent and Africa (Tabesh Heravi, 1392: 15). Some analysts consider the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to reach the warm waters of India as their main motivation. Because access to the warm waters of India was one of the historical and permanent dreams and goals of the Russians, and the design of this premise was rooted in the expansionist attitude and advances of the Russian tsarist government in the 18th and 19th centuries.

In the 19th century, the tsarist rulers of Russia extended their rule to South and Central Asia, and then this expansionist policy was followed by the Bolshevik rulers and the Soviet Socialist Government and the Soviet Communist Party. Therefore, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the beginning of the third decade of the 20th century was evaluated by some Western analysts and politicians in order to complete the tsarist and communist development policy of the Russians; But the Soviet leaders reacted strongly and doubted any thoughts and plans in this matter. The Soviet leaders deemed the demand for development to access the wealth and natural resources of other countries, as an imperialist character and the colonialism of the western imperialists, whom the smell of the oil attracts them to the energy sources and wealth of other lands (Muslim students, 1372: 7).

Although the Soviet leaders denied the existence of any relationship between the invasion of Afghanistan and

access to warm waters and other resources in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East; But he placed the military aggression on Afghanistan at the Shindand airport, 360 kilometers from the Strait of Hormuz and the eastern borders of Afghanistan, in the narrow mouth of Khyber. This location could easily be the point of departure of the Soviet forces in reach or at least in the direction of threatening the important and strategic regions of the Indian Ocean and the Middle East.

International factors

The Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan and the occupation of this country also have international dimensions, and the combination of these factors caused the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The communist regime led by Hafizullah Amin was approaching the West Pole and had established relations with Pakistan and Iran. As Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi reported to the US on October 31, 1979, Hafizullah Amin spoke passionately about friendly relations with the West. Fearing that Afghanistan under the leadership of Hafizullah Amin would not fall into the American trap like Egypt under the leadership of Anwar Sadat, so that decades of Soviet efforts would not be wasted, the Soviets attacked Afghanistan and launched a new puppet regime. What they had done before and with bloody aggression in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, the Soviets thought that if this time the Islamic government, neither eastern nor western, dominates Afghanistan, with the geographical and cultural proximity between Afghanistan and the countries of Central Asia, the Soviet border will soon reach the vicinity of Moscow. Probably to prevent it, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. As Gromov, the commander of the Red Army in Afghanistan, considers the Islamic uprising in Iran and Afghanistan to be the reason for the occupation of Afghanistan (Mousavi, 1388: 130).

The People's Republic of China had become a great world power with more revolutionary and practical slogans and had stolen the ideal position of communism and socialism from the Soviet Union. Especially since its relations with America were getting better and with the Soviet Union getting darker. The occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviets also put pressure on Communist China. The United States of America, which had failed shamefully and with heavy losses in Vietnam, and had lost its strength, was ashamed of the world. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union felt victorious and proud in supporting the communists who wanted freedom in Vietnam. In order to trap its rival in Afghanistan and create a Soviet Vietnam in Afghanistan, America indirectly tried to make the Red

Army flow into Afghanistan and that day would be the beginning of the destruction of the Soviet Union. As Zbigniew Brzezinski admits this. On the other hand, the American conflict in Iran due to the hostage taking of its diplomats caused further Soviet interventions in Afghanistan to take a more acute form. Also, America's lack of success in attracting the cooperation and support of other western countries in the Afghanistan issue caused the western countries not to show much interest. Therefore, America's approach to this issue took the form of a clash between two superpowers. In this aspect, international factors also caused the Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan militarily (Versji, 1381: 83).

The reaction of the Afghan people against the Soviet military aggression

The Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan, in addition to shocking the world, was very difficult and unbearable for the people of Afghanistan; because the people of Afghanistan lost their political dignity. Because the country was occupied and the political, economic, social, cultural, religious and intellectual independence of the people was violated. The people of Afghanistan as a whole prepared for defense and jihad against the communist system and the occupation of the country by the Soviets. On February 22, 1980, they rose up against the Soviets and the communist regime. Uprisings continued in all parts of Afghanistan, from north to south and from east to west, and the Russians responded with blood and fire. A few months after the 22nd February uprising of the same year, the students of Kabul University also rose up. But the members of the People's Democratic Party and the soldiers of the regime responded with bullets and painted Kabul University with blood. Like Naheed, an Afghani girl was also martyred in this university demonstration (Mousavi, 1388: 142). After the Soviet forces entered Afghanistan and installed Babrak Karmal on the presidential throne, Afghan scholars and clerics reacted strongly. Because the Soviet Union was a non-Islamic country and Babrak Karmal was their puppet, which maintained its sovereignty over the Islamic society of Afghanistan with their support. It was for these reasons that at the beginning of 1980, the meeting of the Islamic Conference was held to condemn the Soviet military aggression in Saudi Arabia, religious scholars there declared Jihad against the Soviets and Karmal (Ataei, 1399: 415).

In this way, the people of Afghanistan were obliged to join Jihad. On the other hand, the flood of Afghan immigrants who had gone to Pakistan and Iran were sent to military training centers by the jihadist leaders and their colleagues, and it was not until a year passed that the trained fighters entered the field. Mujahideen and national fighters of Afghanistan bored the Soviet

military forces and the Karmal administration. The Soviets considered the issue simple and started fighting against it with technical strength; but they knew later that they faced the people of Afghanistan and ultimately caused their defeat (Ataei, 1399: 415).

The consequences of the military aggression of the Soviet Union to Afghanistan

The Soviet Union's military aggression against Afghanistan has political and security consequences, economic consequences, and social and cultural consequences for both Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, each of which is briefly stated below:

Consequences of Soviet military aggression on Afghanistan

What that military aggression imposed on Afghanistan itself and its deprived nation was oppression, coercion, massacre, condemnation, displacement and destruction of all the individual and social aspects of this society (Tabesh Heravi, 1392: 63). Here are some of those consequences in brief:

Political and security implications

With the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan, as explained earlier, the political dignity of the Afghan people was destroyed. The independence of the country was questioned. Political instability prevailed in the country. Soviet aggression led to the collapse of the existing political system and civil war between different Mujahideen groups. Increased violence and civil wars began. Civil wars started and Afghanistan turned into a hub for the activities of extremist groups. As a result, the proxy war was strengthened and the support of the Western and regional countries (America, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia) to the Mujahideen groups added to the security instability. Unfortunately, one of the features of the revolution and uprising of the people of Afghanistan is that all uprisings and revolutions have had favorable results for the people and the land of the revolutionaries in the short and long term; But in Afghanistan, these favorable results were stolen by others and even the enemies of Afghanistan took advantage of it, and the people were left with regrets and booty, tears and sighs, blood and ashes, and that's it (Mousavi, 1388: 153).

Economic consequences

Another consequence of the Soviet military aggression on Afghanistan is the economic consequences that turned the country into ruins. All the economic assets and infrastructure of the country were damaged and industry and wealth stagnation prevailed in the country. From 1979-1988, the Soviet army attacked Kabul. Fierce wars took place in the surrounding area

and the country was severely damaged due to Russian bombardment. Seventy percent of the villages were either destroyed or severely damaged. Irrigation systems and roads were destroyed and agriculture faced a terrible stagnation (Ataei, 1399: 486).

The war between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union destroyed the physical capital and national infrastructure and caused serious damage to production and trade and caused the spread of poverty (Ishaq Zahi Yousefi, 1403). As a result of the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, facilities and infrastructures in this country were destroyed. At the same time, it hindered the development and progress of Afghanistan in the cultural, economic and social fields. Also, with the invasion of Russian troops into Afghanistan, a series of external interventions in the affairs of this country began. It will take many years to eliminate the negative effects of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Like: The psychological effects of this war will remain for a long time for the generation that was in the war and the generation that was not yet produced. From the point of view of reconstruction, at least 10 years or more are needed to be able to stabilize our economic indicators. Therefore, it can be said that the Soviet air and ground attacks led to the widespread destruction of cities and villages and, as a result, the destruction of infrastructure. The migration of villagers and the destruction of agricultural lands caused the fall of agricultural production, and as a result, agricultural and industrial production in the country decreased. One of the most important economic consequences of the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan is that Afghanistan became dependent on humanitarian and international aid for decades, and this situation continues until now.

Social and cultural consequences

The invasion of the Soviet Red Army into Afghanistan caused the death of 1.5 million innocent people in this country. Six million people were displaced and hundreds of thousands of people were crippled and disabled due to the crimes of the Red Army. Also, the collapse of all the assets and cultural capitals happened to the people of Afghanistan (Ataei, 1399: 487; Mousavi, 1388: 146).

Social solidarity weakened throughout the country and the war deepened the social and economic gap (Ishaq Zahi Yousefi, 1403). The imposition of the Russian puppet government under the leadership of Babrak and the communists shook the country's scientific and cultural foundations. In 1983, the number of students from Kabul University was reduced to 5,000, and this was one of the strong blows on the country's culture. In the same year, 1,400 students were sent to the Soviet Union to study, which caused the opposition and anger

of the Mujahideen of Afghanistan (Ataei, 1399: 425).

Despite all the restrictions, in 1983, 145 thousand students were studying in schools. Most of the cultural institutions of the youth had an outward aspect and the dangerous issue was that the Soviet advisers trained the Afghan youth in such a way that they only have Soviet friendship in their hearts and forget Islamic and Afghan traditions. All the affairs of Bakhtar Agency, Radio, Television, Cinema, Theater and Press were implemented by the supervision and guidance advisors and the orders of the Soviets (Ataei, 1399: 426).

The consequences of the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan on the Soviet Union itself

Political and security implications

In the current bipolar international system, any change caused by the effects of external factors has a direct effect on the main power of the "center" and an indirect effect on the "surrounding" governments, but active. Therefore, Afghanistan's war with the Soviet Union had a direct effect on the disintegration of the Soviet Union and an indirect effect on the collapse of Moscow-affiliated regimes (Danshiar, 1371: 307). Also, the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Afghanistan war made this country not only not defend the opponents of the Chinese government; but also justify it. The defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan made its defense of the "Noriega" regime ineffective against the American military aggression. The war in Afghanistan caused the political defeat of the Soviet Union in the world and made this superpower not only free and isolated in Islamic countries; Moreover, the communist parties of Europe also condemned the aggression and campaign of the Soviets in Afghanistan. The defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan prevented this superpower from directly supporting Iraq, its main ally in the Middle East, and Moscow's withdrawal reached the point where America completely destroyed Iraq in an unprecedented campaign, without any practical response from its nuclear rival (Danshiar, 1371: 306).

Economic consequences

The Soviets spent billions of dollars in the war in Afghanistan and this put a lot of pressure on their economy. The costs of the war and international sanctions led to economic stagnation and reduced production in the Soviet Union. Due to instability and war, foreign investors were reluctant to invest in the Soviet Union, which led to a decrease in economic growth.

Social and cultural consequences

In the war in Afghanistan, about 14,453 Soviet soldiers were killed and 53,753 people were wounded, and these losses had a deep impact on the Soviet society

(Ataei, 1399: 426). The return of wounded soldiers and the expression of bitter memories of the war had a negative effect on public morale and increased social problems in the Soviet Union, and the defeat in Afghanistan caused a review of the ideology and cultural policies of the Soviet Union.

CONCLUSION

The Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan is one of the key events in the contemporary history of Afghanistan as well as the Cold War era, the consequences of which affected the region and the world beyond the borders of Afghanistan. Examining the internal and external factors of this aggression shows that the political and social conditions prevailing in Afghanistan, especially after the April coup of 1978, paved the way for Soviet military intervention. Political instability, the internal differences of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the Soviet effort to maintain its strategic influence in the region were among the most important reasons for this event.

From the analysis of the consequences of this aggression, we can see that the Soviet military presence not only did not help to stabilize the political situation in Afghanistan; Rather, it led to the escalation of crises, the start of a long-term war, and the strengthening of opposition forces, including the Afghan Mujahideen. From an international point of view, this aggression led to an increase in tensions between the Eastern and Western blocs and encouraged the US and its allies to provide extensive support to anti-Soviet groups in Afghanistan. This ultimately contributed to the erosion of Soviet power, its economic and social weakening, and ultimately the collapse of the Soviet Union in the beginnings of 1990. On the other hand, Afghanistan faced irreparable damages due to the consequences of this aggression. Widespread human casualties, destruction of infrastructure and displacement of millions of people were among the direct and indirect consequences of this war. Also, the Soviet military intervention and its withdrawal caused more instability in Afghanistan, the effects of which continue to this day.

From a scientific perspective, this study emphasizes that foreign military intervention, especially when accompanied by an incomplete understanding of a country's internal conditions, can lead to disastrous consequences. In addition, this event is a clear example of the effects of geopolitical competition of great powers on small and fragile countries. The current research shows that a detailed understanding of the political and social history of a country and paying attention to the long-term consequences of military interventions can prevent the recurrence of such disasters.

In general, the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan can be seen as one of the prominent examples of the failure of developmentalist policies, which not only did not achieve the goals of the attackers; Rather, it led to more instability and crises at the national and international levels.

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