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REVEALING HARDWARE USEFULNESS: EXAMINING METHODS OF DESIGN

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ABOUT ARTICLE

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Abstract: This study delves into the functionality and design methods of hardware, aiming to uncover the intricacies that define its usefulness. By examining various design methodologies and their application in creating functional hardware, the research highlights key factors influencing design decisions and outcomes. The study analyzes case studies and empirical data to explore how design methodologies contribute to optimizing hardware performance, reliability, and usability. Insights gained from this analysis provide a deeper understanding of the principles guiding effective hardware design and their implications for technological advancement.

INTRODUCTION

The various types of entities in the world were of interest to traditional ontology. For instance, Aristotle in his Classes was keen on grouping the creatures (onta) there are and needed to distinguish the creatures that are generally major and genuine inside that order (Safeguards, 2007). Heidegger posed the question in a different way in Being and Time, rather than asking what kinds of entities there are: what are the sorts of ways that substances can be in the worl. In contrast to Aristotle, the Heideggerian approach examines the way things are rather than listing the various kinds of entities. There are many different kinds of beings in our world: objects, people, plants, animals, water, and so forth These entities could have different ways of "being" in the world, according to Heidegger. In Being and Time, he discusses the various ways that Dasein's being in the world can be viewed. Heidegger makes an effort to help his readers comprehend the unitary relationship that exists between the various aspects of Dasein's being in the world. The concepts of "being-in," "the world," and "that which is in the

world," also known as "the who" or "the self," are the first three. As per Heidegger, the most ideal way to concentrate on Dasein‟s existential constitution is by going to what is "optically nearest" as far as we might be concerned, that is to say, our regular circumstances (Heidegger, 1962). In Heideggerian terms, we must endeavor to comprehend ourselves in our everydayness, or daily existence. However, this is a difficult task because we are likely to misinterpret ourselves as soon as we look in the mirror. Seeing oneself as essentially detached is a common mistake; Heidegger thinks about this as a result of a long ontologically deluding Cartesian practice that has been acknowledged throughout some stretch of time without addressing.

In Being and Time, Heidegger's first task is to dismantle this idea and demonstrate that humans are engaged actors in everyday situations rather than spectators, using the term "Dasein-being-in-the-world". This suggests that humans are actively engaged beings that are immersed in a living context made up of things, people, other living things, culture, and so on. The substance might fluctuate from one individual to another as well as from setting to setting. However, if Dasein is being-in-the-world, then the world itself is an essential component of our existence. This entails that the fact that humans are always actively engaged with their world is one of the defining characteristics of human existence. Further on, Dasein's "equipment" is a fundamental part of the world. It is counterintuitive to think of "equipment" as merely free-floating entities. Rather, the gear is Dasein‟s approach to being. However, Dasein's mode of existence differs from the spatiotemporal characteristics of the world's equipment (Heidegger, 1962; Heidegger, 1988. When Heidegger states that only Dasein can touch, whereas a chair can touch the wall, Heidegger makes this distinction very clear. The wall and the seat can't connect each other in the manner Dasein experiences the seat (Heidegger, 1962). Dasein is capable of encountering otherworldly beings. In Dasein's interactions with the world, we encounter chairs, walls, computers, cars, hammers, and tables, according to Heideggerian logic. Although they may exist inertly and independently of Dasein's practices, they are only relevant in light of Dasein's engaged practices.

Ready-to-Hand and Present-at-Hand:

Heidegger contends that relics can be on the planet in two ways based on how they are being experienced by Dasein over his dealings with the world. In its everyday world, Dasein typically encounters entities as "ready-to-hand" (Zuhandenheit) and others as "present-at-hand" (Vorhandenheit). Most of the things we encounter in our daily lives are readily available. Our relationship to things that are handy or useful is referred to as the ready-to-hand. Entities are encountered as a continuous collection of relationships that are interconnected. This is our lived experience and our primordial relationship with the world. "Tools, objects of use, cultural products,

things of value and significance" are referred to as equipment in Heideggerian analysis (McDaniel, 2013). According to Heidegger (1962), "we shall call those entities which we encounter in regard "equipment." In our dealings, we come across equipment for writing, sewing, working, transportation, and measurement. In the Heideggerian framework, the term "equipment" refers to a technical term that is interpreted not in an ontic but rather in an ontological sense. Even though Heidegger uses the term "equipment" to explain this idea, its meaning extends beyond just physical tools. Then, equipment could be anything from a sign to an environment to a service mechanism. He states that "it includes everything we make use of domestically or in public life" when equipment is taken in this ontological sense, not just sewing or writing tools. Street lamps are also pieces of equipment in this broad ontological sense (Heidegger, 1988).

Imagine that while a carpenter is hammering, he comes across a hammer as equipment. According to Heidegger (1962) and Riemer (2014), the carpenter encounters the hammer because of his familiarity with it and the work he does, namely hammering (Heidegger, 2014). This "in-order-to" relationship is one in which one uses equipment to complete a specific task; In the case of a carpenter, it is used for shaping, driving nails in, and removing them. There isn't much of a hammer in use other than a wooden shaft and a metallic sphere. When it is ready to use, the hammer as a tool hides itself and its properties. In the ordinary pragmatic utilization of pounding, the sledge pulls out from our immediate consideration and stays unnoticeable. It is readily available because it is absent. Heidegger wants to show, using the hammer as an example, that we encounter equipment in our everyday interactions as an in-order-to rather than in a theoretical way.

When approached in disengaged reflection, the same entity might also appear to Dasein as present-at-hand. The entity can be approached for a variety of reasons, including pure curiosity, as a subject of the first encounter, as a subject of design, as the subject of scientific investigation, and so on. The entity is present for Dasein in all of these situations, and the object itself—through its properties—takes precedence over the practical activity. We consider an entity to be inert, determinate, and isolable at the moment (McDaniel, 2013).

The point made by Heidegger is that the equipment's existence is not fully revealed in any one mode. The hammer's Vorhandenheit is revealed through disengaged observation or analysis, while its Zuhandenheit is revealed through its performance. However, they are not two distinct entities; rather, they are encounters of the same entity in either ready-to-hand or present-at-hand modes of being. In the words of Boedeker (2005):

Neither is presence-to-hand a universal formal structure nor a super-property. Instead, it is just one of many ways that we can meet entities. It is to be contrasted, for instance, with "readiness-at-hand" (Zuhandenheit), in which we encounter entities in terms of their usefulness to our practical projects or their lack thereof. Importantly, "presence-to-hand" and "readiness-to-hand" are not different kinds of entities because they are just different ways of encountering what Heidegger calls "intraworldly entities," which are the same as "physical objects." Heidegger says that modern science made the mistake of treating the "present-at-hand" mode of being as fundamental and superior when, in fact, it is just one of many ways we can encounter entities. Heidegger (1962) draws a distinction between a practical understanding and a theoretical understanding that is uninterested:

In the event that we take a gander at things just 'hypothetically', we can get along without understanding „readiness-to-hand". Yet, when we manage them by utilizing them and controlling them, this movement is definitely not a visually impaired one; It has its own kind of sight, which guides our manipulation...Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the numerous assignments of the "in order to." (p. 98) Heidegger refers to this kind of sight circumspection as Umsicht; The original way of seeing is always in relation to our projects, its uses, its function as something that must be done, and its ability to point beyond itself in relation to the task at hand. Each substance that is first gotten a handle on by our meticulousness is „ready-to-hand" (Zuhandenheit) before the chance of its being seen or intuited as present-within reach (Vorhandenheit) (Inwood, 1999 and Riemer, 2011).When the elements are checked exclusively as present out- within reach, it loses its natural significance and warmth of relationship with different creatures. It is considered one of the batches of materials with only numerical representations as it loses its context. These representations fail to capture the complexity and richness of life that the equipment is associated with.

The Paradox of Invisibility:

Heidegger makes the point that our "present-at-hand mode" of being is not what makes our daily lives unique. We are not beings who engage in detached contemplation for the majority of our daily lives. Rather, we are creatures frequently assimilated in specific practices. "The world and all its contents, including things, artifacts, our body and others, are both invisible and subordinate to our practices" when we engage in such practices (Riemer, 2014). To put it another way, when an entity is in use, it becomes invisible, but when it fails to perform or is observed from a distance, it becomes visible. Consider the world of a medical professional who uses a stethoscope to listen to a patient's heartbeat. Because the stethoscope is so much a part of her, she doesn't see it as a thing made of a specific, definable substance that spans space and time, but rather as something that helps her do her job. She

sees the world through the stethoscope. She establishes an embodiment relation, in the words of Don Ihde (Ihde, 2009). That is, the stethoscope influences her perception of the patient's medical condition when she listens to the patient's heartbeat. Like the hammer in Heidegger's example, the stethoscope partially leaves her awareness. This relationship can be described as "world" (doctor and stethoscope). The stethoscope has become a part of her when she looks out at the world, as indicated by the parentheses. She becomes embodied in the stethoscope as it disappears from her awareness.

A hermeneutic relation is another possibility (Ihde, 2009). At the point when a specialist needs to have data about what occurs inside the patient‟s body, she peruses the X-beam and X-ray reports. The connection between what is read and the patient's body is then taken for granted. As a means of observation, the medical reports in this instance do not become a part of the doctor's body but rather of the world she observes. After that, the connection can be presented as a doctor (world medical report). Heidegger writes in 1988:

In a familiar environment, we do not always and never have an explicit perception of the things around us, and certainly not in a way that would make us specifically aware of them as useful. It is definitively on the grounds that an unequivocal mindfulness and confirmation of their being within reach doesn't happen that we have them around us in an unconventional manner, similarly as they are in themselves. (The paradox of equipment is the equipment's invisibility in a familiar setting or when it works well. When in use, the equipment blends in or remains undetectable. According to Heidegger (Heidegger, 1962), "the equipment withdraws as we concern ourselves in the work." The doctor is so preoccupied with listening to the patient's heartbeat that she barely notices the stethoscope when she is completely focused on it. This invisibility exemplifies the paradoxical nature of something that we perceive to be readily available. Intangibility isn't introduced as anything less beneficial here however as a positive component of hardware. When we put a piece of equipment to use, not when we look at it or think about it, we can tell if it is ready to use. "Equipment is truly encountered as what it is only when it is not experienced at all," according to Kai Reimer (Riemer, 2014). Only malfunctioning, broken equipment makes its presence known. A messed up hammer, hanged PC, missing device, lost scenes, a bombed arrangement of administration organization, etc, noisily report their presence.

The stethoscope allows the doctor to fully engage in her ministry of healing as long as it functions normally. Good equipment never shows up and always disappears. "The distinction between self and external world (including others) fades" in such an engagement we become so preoccupied with the task at hand that we "lose ourselves" in it. "The self must forget itself, if lost in the world of equipment, it is able to actually go to work and manipulate something," Heidegger writes (Heidegger, 1962).

Equipment as a System:

Equipment does not appear in Dasein's everyday world as an isolated, determinate object or group of objects. It is constantly experienced as a framework with a „in-request to" structure as Heidegger calls it. Heidegger wrote in 1962: If taken strictly, "equipment" does not exist. There is always a totality of equipment to the Being of any equipment, in which it may be this equipment that it is. A totality of equipment is constituted by various ways of the "in-order-to," such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, and manipulability. Equipment is essentially "something in-order-to....") Heidegger refers to this in-order-to as an essential structure of equipment that is present in the world. Dasein finds out what an item is when it is "in order to," or when it is "ready to use." In this sense, a stethoscope is seen as a "to-listen-to-heartbeat," not as a set of metal wires and a diaphragm. I think of a smart phone as the one that lets me make calls and send text messages. Even if it's an old clunker, people first see a car as a means of transportation before seeing it as status, freedom, empowerment, independence, and so on. It doesn't matter how fashionable a car is if it doesn't serve as a vehicle that facilitates transportation. This is due to the fact that people first encounter automobiles as "in order to transport" equipment in everyday interactions. This uncovers to us a crucial truth about the approaches to being of hardware. Dasein frequently encounters equipment based not on its scientific or metaphysical properties but rather on its application in a particular circumstance created by other equipment and human practices.

Each piece of equipment is constituted by the system's members because it is a part of a system of equipment. Equipment is always "being-in-the-totality" of equipment, just like Dasein is always "being-in-the-world." Heidegger delivers an alternate comprehension of gear that there is no such „thing" as a piece of hardware. The antic understanding of equipment completely disregards the fact that the being of any equipment is constituted by a totality of equipment when viewed in terms of material terms (Heidegger, 1962; Munday, 2006). In fact, every piece of equipment is thought to be part of another piece of equipment.

Take the room encounter as an illustration. My room is more than just a piece of equipment in the sense that it is a collection of other pieces of equipment that make up a room. It is also more than just one piece of equipment. It is not only seen as a geometric space "between four walls," but also as a set of tools for living made up of other tools and human practices like pens, paper, lamps, furniture, computers, printers, routers, wires, windows, doors, rooms, and so on. It also includes some behaviors that are expected to happen in personal rooms. It has already been established that an "individual" piece of equipment manifests itself in a collection of equipment (Heidegger, 1962; Munday, 2009).

In the equipment as a whole, each tool has a specific place in the system. According to Heidegger, the equipment system as a whole is comparable to his world. The ontological understanding of the world is relational in nature, in which the world is not fixed or absolute but emerges as a result of a heterogeneous network of entities rather than an assemblage, in contrast to the antic understanding of the world, which is a collection of entities with each entity having a predetermined structure. Computers, wires, mobile phones, printers, tables, and electricity are individual tools that are part of this world; however, these artifacts are not considered equipment in the Heideggerian sense. Indeed, even the amount of the multitude of individual things of instruments doesn't make up the entirety of hardware. When the focus is solely on an artifact, the equipment as a network of related entities, which is also constituted by the task for which the individual piece of equipment stands, remains hidden. For instance, hammering is only made up of the hammer as a tool. Harman (2002) provides an excellent summary of Heidegger's point:

Any possibility that independent objects exist in a vacuum away from the relations, functions, and meanings world. He believes that the tool, in its actual use, is part of a global system that has combined all of its parts into a single global effect. Specific beings can only ever emerge from within this system. Heidegger refers to the equipment's totality as a systemic feature. The metal wires, stomach, a sound transducer, the sound codec gadgets, the speakers, binaural cylinders, batteries, etc in a stethoscope whenever taken alone don't mean something very similar. It is combined with numerous other intricately engineered parts. The stethoscope always reflects the characteristics of the associated equipment. A stethoscope is a tool that "listens" to heartbeats only in relation to other tools. In this way, the main understanding is that no singular thing of hardware remains solitary however is brought into an arrangement of hardware pieces making a gear. Despite the fact that we are hardly aware of the entirety of this equipment in our ontic consideration, the task of stethoscopping cannot be accomplished without it. Gear, as a matter of fact, capabilities "by disappearing for the noticeable reality that it brings about"(Harman, 2002) - metal wires and stomach for stethoscope and carpenter’s apparatuses for the apparent house. Every piece of equipment used for withdrawal "allows the ultimate reference to swallow all of its component forces into an invisible system or network lying silently beneath it". Present-within reach is noticeable of gear and what is behind the apparent the truth is prepared to-hand. Harman refers to the unidentified labor that exists behind each piece of equipment.

The second insight is that only through our concerned interactions and its use does equipment acquire its identity and significance. According to Heidegger (1962) and Riemer (2011), equipment always derives its particular "in-order-to." According to Heidegger's statement (Heidegger, 1962,), "the

structure of the Being of what is ready-to-hand as equipment is determined by references or assignments (Verweisung)." The structure of these references or assignments is "in order to". By referential entirety, Heidegger suggests that a singular thing of gear shows up as alluding to different substances inside an entirety of hardware (Sinclair, 2006). A doctor uses a stethoscope on a daily basis; it alludes to the client. It serves a purpose, or "in order to." It likewise alludes to different material things with which it is made of. Mark Sinclair puts it this way: These references aren't the "things" themselves; rather, they are the horizon in which they can appear—a horizon of meaning or sense through which equipment can be seen as referring to each other. These snare of references or tasks themselves are not unequivocally seen yet "they are somewhat 'there' when we concernfully submit ourselves to them… ". When the "assignment has been disturbed-when something is unusable for some purpose" (Heidegger, 196), it becomes explicit.

"The context of equipment is lit up...With this totality, however, the world announces itself". "World hood" is an ontological concept and stands for the structure of one of the constitutive items of Being-in-the-world...moreover, that assignments and referential totalities could in some sense become constitutive for World hood itself," Heidegger says. The structure of this referential totality is an a priori transcendental horizon. Heidegger says that this horizon is a system of relationships that makes up the equipment's way of being. We frequently disregard the equipment as a whole and treat it as a single component. But, as Harman points out, the important thing isn't our finding that "equipment is always found in conjunction with related items... but (sic) what is essential is that at the level of readiness-to-hand, the idea of a single tool reposing in its solitary effect is shown to be untenable," as Harman puts it. Instead, a global tool empire has already dissolved individual equipment.

Conceptuality of Equipment:

In the background of some "specific familiarities" and "competencies for dealing things and others," equipment is always encountered (Hall, 1993). For instance, a stethoscope can only be considered "ready-to-hand" equipment for someone who is familiar with the health care environment and its "network of practical relations." The stethoscope is only present—on hand—to a person who is unfamiliar with medical procedures. The user still requires a wider range of more fundamental and fundamental familiarities to deal with any tools, in addition to the specific familiarities and coping skills associated with healthcare activities and practical settings. Dreyfus calls it the reasonableness and fittingness of hardware (Dreyfus, 2007); That is, an artifact must first be suitable for a project before it can be used as equipment. When it possesses all of the necessary material properties to complete the

project, it is considered suitable. However, even though suitability is a requirement for something to be an equipment, it is not sufficient on its own.

According to Reimer (2014) and Dreyfus (1980), the appropriateness of equipment is determined by its relation to the entirety of other equipment, the shared practices that are involved in it, user competencies, and other broader social orthodoxies that can only be meaningful in particular contexts (Reimer, 2014). These are what Dreyfus refers to as practical holism, a broader perspective necessary for interpreting what it means to be a human being, a tool, a citizen, a student, a doctor, an employee, and so on. These social practices are learned by being raised in a certain environment, not by learning rules and beliefs. Heidegger refers to it as "befindlichkeiten" deciphered as "attunement" - a state one ends up in with no conscious doing, winding up in a setting before one subsides into it, "the state in which one might be found". (This background cannot be made explicit in a theoretical form through a detached analysis (Dreyfus, 1980; Liberman, 2012; Heidegger, 1962). It is possible to argue that even basic skills like body movement and language, as well as encountering equipment, necessitate some rule learning. It is accepted, but when a user becomes proficient, "such rules, (sic) are left behind and a single unified, flexible, purposeful pattern of behavior is all that remains;" furthermore, it is a vain work to formalize these methodology. Heidegger wrote in 1962:

Assignments and references have significance that "can be formalized in the sense of a system of Relations...The phenomenal content of these "Relations" and "Relata"... resist any kind of mathematical fictionalization;" neither are they merely a thought that was initially expressed in an "act of thinking." They are somewhat connections in which concernful prudence as such as of now abides. Only in the background of a network of relations—familiarity and expertise, which are frequently non-represent able—can an entity in its explicit form be discovered (Hall, 1993). It is referred to by Heidegger as primordial understanding or truth. The user is able to interact with the equipment in a different way because of these various background practices. Because of this, when we deal with the equipment with concern, certain features become relevant or irrelevant. No hardware is plainly obvious. Instead, everything is bound by supplementary. Therefore, the shared background practices determine the appropriateness of an individual piece of equipment; the relationship structure. Individual devices like screws, fasteners, ranges, decks, braces, rails, heap footings, etc gain character and importance by getting gulped into the bigger arrangement of the extension. So, the use of a tool reveals its meaning, and the use of equipment reveals its meaning in the larger context of what it is used for in its larger equip mental way of being in the world. Therefore, there is no point at which it reaches its ultimate end. Its nature could more accurately be described as circular (Munday, 2006; Heidegger, 1962).

It is not necessary to decide that the same artifacts belong in another setting. For instance, most Baby Boomers and Generation Xers only use their cell phones to make calls or send texts. However, a similar PDA might appear to a millennial as that which permits gaming, web perusing, photography and making and keeping up with virtual networks or the auto signals become significant with regards to vehicles and traffic guidelines (Heidegger, 1962). "For Heidegger equipment is its context," as Harman puts it correctly (Harman, 2002). Outside of its proper context, a piece of equipment is always opaque (Munday, 2006).

The most important take away from this discussion is not that each piece of equipment acquires meaning and value in response to the circumstances in which it is used; rather, the most important takeaway is that every tool is entwined with a particular system of relations that defines and determines its ways of being. As a result, the equip mental structure's system of relations gives each tool its own distinct position. It is a unitary phenomenon in which the entire individual realm is already dissolved while in action, and this totality of equipment is not just a sum total of ontic entities or a location for tool pieces (Harman, 2002). (Heidegger, 1962; Munday, 2006) Heidegger refers to it as an equip mental way of being.

Seeing Beyond the Present:

This part reconnects with the past subjects that we talked about by setting them according to plan. We are more familiar with design in terms of its functional performance, ergonomic comfort, and aesthetic value, but the ontological conditions that underpin design remain far removed from us. Limiting ourselves to an ontic understanding of equipment poses a risk because it conceals the true nature of the equipment's character and leads us to believe that it is an isolated instance of an artifact assisting us in performing a function. What this paper attempts to bring up is that the ongoing plan concerns ought to reach out a long ways past the physical and quantifiable ontic highlights to incorporate the failed to remember ontological circle which coordinates and designs our reasoning and encounters. A crisis in today's design practice is to ignore equipment's ontological foundation (Buckley, 1992).

Today's design field is a mystery due to its failure to recognize the relational aspect of design and its original unity with ontic and ontological design. This is because we are stuck in a particular metaphysical tradition that is frequently referred to as "rationalistic," "Cartesian," "objectivist," and "mechanistic" (worldview), "reductionist" (science), "positivistic" (epistemologically), and, more recently, "computation list" (Escobar). Heidegger would refer to this as "machination" or "gestell6" at other times in Gestell is the technological enflaming of things into standing in reserve, whereas

machination is the emergence of the manipulative power as a possessive and coercive force of order. It is the outgrowth of a long western otherworldly custom called mysticism of presence universally growing its unshakable orderings appeared in our ordinary lived insight, market systems, business rationalities including configuration rehearses. A fallen state is any attempt to reduce equipment to its immediate utility or physical appearance. It is referred to as the forgetfulness of the true nature of being by Heidegger. The being of artifacts disappears, and as a result, it will never be less than what we see or say about it. Because it is elusive and not readily accessible to us, it necessitates interpretation. Reductionism is trying to know them only by what is there. "Without any explicit knowledge of the clues which function here, without any acquaintance with the fundamental ontological function of time or even any understanding of it and without any insight into the reason why this function is possible," Heidegger criticizes this interpretation of being that has emerged since the Greeks' time in Being and Time (Heidegger, 1962). When Heidegger says, "entities are grasped in their being as "presence,"," he is advising us about the consequences of metaphysics of presence. This indicates that they are understood in relation to a specific time period; the "Past". The apparatus takes on meaning for me as the entirety of my existential possibilities as it appears in my temporality. Therefore, equipment must be defined by more than just "what is present." It acquires its identity by being a part of an "equip mental totality" whose ways of being in time shape it. Therefore, the equipment is more than what we perceive.

From a specific perspective, Heidegger spent the entire of his logical profession to explain this knowledge that being isn't presence. According to Heidegger, "being is understandable only by way of time," so being is not presence because being is time. We must think and speak of being in terms of the temporal in order to properly think and speak of being without conflating it with other beings. Time or temporality is the fundamental ontological foundation of human existence (Heidegger, 1988).

Time cannot be restricted to the present because it is a unified phenomenon that extends continuously into the past and future. In the sense of reaching out beyond oneself, Heidegger prefers to refer to this as the ecstatic nature of time. The human way of being is fundamentally based on this ecstatic nature of time. We stand out in both the world of today and the possibilities of the future. The krisis in contemporary design practice is that we have confined ourselves to the present while the future is the primary dimension of our existence, forgetting our fundamental ecstatic nature. Therefore, human failure to recognize our own existential possibilities constitutes the krisis (Rojcewicz, 2006). Human might advance in idealizing our logical seeing but be oblivious to our own circumstances that would make us focused in the bliss of the present. Being is not being seems like technical jargon at first glance, but a closer look reveals that it is something that takes place in our everyday world. We usually think

of something as what it looks like or how useful it is to us or how it looks. This is plain to see on account of, say, versatile or the fluorescent lights that we frequently use. However, according to Heidegger, there is always more to a mobile phone or fluorescent lamp than what we see or say, so merely referring to its use, exterior appearance, or concepts is misleading. We do not fully comprehend the existence of things like phones and fluorescent lights. In other words, being, Heidegger refers to it as "ways to be" (Heidegger, 1962).

We use a mobile phone or a fluorescent lamp without realizing it. When I turn on the lamp in my room, I only think about the light that helps me see what's there. When the lamp doesn't give me enough light, I only pay attention to it. The mobile phone is the same way. It only becomes apparent when it breaks down. A kind of absence is actually what things really are. Since things can never be straightforwardly or totally present to us, we are continuously deciphering more than seeing.

However, neither the mobile phone nor the fluorescent lamp is engulfed in absence. It only covers one side. We would not have seen anything if it hadn't been for that. As a result, there is a lot of the lamp or mobile that I can see and relate to. Whoever sees it will notice different things about it. Certain aspects of a thing's nature remain hidden to me whenever I encounter it; for instance, the past while the others appear to have features that could be "interpreted as tools, weapons, or items of entertainment," the former stand out to me. The presence of each and every item is a unique interaction of presence and nonappearance. The existence of all things, including humans, can be extrapolated from the descriptions of mobile phones and fluorescent lamps. In this play of presence and absence, being is revealed. This experience is referred to by Heidegger as an "event" (ereignis), which he meant to occur, occurs, or become visible (Inwood, 1999). We grasp this involvement with our anxiety for the world; distinguishing it just with mental experience and depicting it as far as a subject-object connection is a misconception of what being is. Heidegger does not mean that presence is insignificant by saying this. Rather, that's what his conflict is however presence is rich and complex it doesn't debilitate the importance of Being. Devastating results result from prioritizing a particular mode of temporality, namely understanding the "being of equipment" only in terms of the presencing of things (Anwesen) in the present. For instance, because it is right in front of us, comprehending tools or machines is straightforward and concrete. Krippendorff (2006) highlights how designers are blind to the unintended uses and users of equipment, despite the fact that equipment defined as a system is more complex and accommodates many absent elements as its constituents, such as inventors, operators, recyclers, consumers, user knowledge, marketers, advertisers, government administrators, and so on:

A product is used by many people for a variety of reasons before it reaches its intended audience: to tackle a designing issue, to keep occupations in a plant, to benefit from expanded deals, or to supply supporting contraptions. After it has been put to use, it might be of interest to repair shops, help recycling businesses, or cause environmental havoc for communities that live near dumps.) A krisis situation exists when design considerations are restricted to the producer's profit or the experience of the end user at the expense of all others who are affected by the equipment. The purported end clients are just barely one resource in the huge organization equip mental entirety who need to co-work to carry a plan to presence. Numerous factors that are interested in the end result of a design process surround designers: customers, workers, engineers, financiers, salespeople, recyclers, the environment, other living things, researchers, and so on while much is written and debated about the end users, design practices say little about them. Obliging these variables into the plan interaction of a device or gear helps plan it better and makes the cycle more just and comprehensive.

According to Wahl (2016), the challenges we face today are unprecedented and necessitate novel design strategies rather than "business as usual." However, our design methods are preoccupied with providing quick fixes. A new type of knowledge that can lead us to a new way of being in this world, one that is concerned beyond the present, is required by our universities, industries, infrastructures, energy systems, water management, health systems, and agriculture. Tony Fry says that the current design practices take away our future because we don't know how to make things better for the future. This is because we live in an illusion of permanence that comes from the metaphysics of presence. We hold on to the present like it is forever. Our thinking and behavior are profoundly influenced by an obsession with the present, which hinders the development of a relational, collaborative design culture. We design systems with a win-lose perspective that assumes the other must be controlled, controlled, and subdued. The most defining characteristic of this design or method of coming into being is the transformation of the world into a comprehensive network of resources. This process is always progressing in a huge proportion throughout the world. In this age, it means that we are given beings in the form of reserves, disposables, or stocks; everything around us on the planet is viewed as something there for us to consume. The entire world becomes be stand, or stock, and its existence is set up so that we can use it.

According to Heidegger, this has occurred as a result of our unconscious entrapment in the dehumanizing process of everyday normalization. We are being normalized in a particular ontological tradition that encourages us to pretend to be masters of the earth and centers of the universe while

being blind to our own condition, which makes us slaves. What we need to do right now is develop systems that require win-win situations for all stakeholders and guarantee the benefit of nature.

CONCLUSION

An ontological tradition that values presence over absence must be questioned in order to promote an inclusive design approach to equipment. According to Wildman (2010), p. 55, it calls for revising a relational ontology that asserts that "the relations between entities are ontologically more fundamental than the entities themselves."

A significant amount of reconstruction of the current design paradigms is required if this relational ontology is to be operational zed in design practices. The philosophical phase of this reconstructive process is the sole focus of this paper. Market-based design practices of today have a bias against relational ways of being. The thought that an instrument exists as a different element having its own foreordained design keeps on being one of the "most getting through naturalized, and injurious fictions" of our societies nowadays (Escobar and Dreyfus, 2011).

The promotion of increasingly serious ontological discussions in design practices is one decisive step in this direction. Heidegger is one of the contemporary philosophers who, more than any other contemporary philosopher has made ontological questioning a central part of his thought. The relational nature of the equipment's way of being in the world is brought to the forefront by an ontological understanding of equipment. This interconnectedness of beings has enormous implications for comprehending design agency, design process, and design object. Therefore, design practices need to focus on more than just the work of what we might refer to as proximate designers—those professionals who are closest to the design process and have direct control over the details of the design (Feng, 2004). Little attention has been paid to the ways in which cultural assumptions and values about the product, the future unintended uses of the product, the various stakeholders of the product, ethical issues, the meanings that product forms have for their users, and so forth have the potential to It is autocratic, one-dimensional, and exclusive to limit design agency to nearby designers, which worsens the krisis situation.

The development of interdependent systems is essential to our future. This is only possible if we are guided in our actions by a relational ontology in the back of our minds. We may be able to explore the possibilities of how alternative values can be incorporated into the design process in order to produce designs that are eco-efficient, sustainable, humane, liberating, and eco-friendly rather than oppressive, controlling, and exploitative if we combine ontological insights with current popular design

methodologies that are centered on the market. Additionally, it will assist design methodologists in converting philosophical insights into conceptual design tools to enhance design quality.

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