

EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY
RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT STUDIES

VOLUME04 ISSUE06

Pages: 1-13



MISCONSTRUED FREEDOM: A FEATURE OF PERMISSIVENESS IN RUSSIA

Valerian Golubev

Saint-Petersburg State University, Russia

ABOUT ARTICLE

Key words: Permissiveness, Russia, Misconstrued Freedom, Freedom, Morality, Contradictions, Social Attitudes, Cultural Norms.

Received: 22.05.2024

Accepted: 27.05.2024

Published: 01.06.2024

Abstract: The concept of permissiveness in Russia presents a fascinating paradox. While there may be outward signs of a permissive society, a closer look reveals a more complex reality. This paper explores the concept of "misconstrued freedom" as a defining feature of how permissiveness is portrayed in Russia. It examines how certain freedoms are embraced, while others are restricted, highlighting the underlying tensions and contradictions within Russian society.

INTRODUCTION

Because this is the sphere in which the utopian moods and illusions that are so characteristic of all Russian ideologies were particularly dramatic, the history of the emergence and evolution of permissive ideas and policy in Russia is extremely instructive: Permissive ism attempted to reach the point where an idea becomes a reality numerous times, but it repeatedly failed catastrophically, being defeated by more successful ideological and political rivals and consigned to the miserable position of ephemeral opposition. Both the "permissive international," which emerged in the 19th and 20th centuries, and its leaders, who played a key role in ideological and political discourse in Western Europe and the United States, were never inclined to overcome their Russo phobic prejudices, global aspirations, and regional selfishness in order to provide real and effective support to like-minded Russians. This is also demonstrated by the particular historical circumstances and forms of the downfall of national permissive ideology and politics.

In the 20th century, Russian permissive ism twice compromised itself to such an extent that there is little hope for a forthcoming revival of permissive ideas. There are literally a lot of books on the temporary book market whose authors explain in detail, and sometimes quite convincingly, the reasons for the historical failure of permissive democracy in the hopes, not unreasonably, that readers will comprehend them.

The "permissive revolution" in the early 1990s, which again led the Russian state to an economic disaster like it did in 1917, was carried out under the motto of planned demolition of the "Soviet totalitarian empire." This immediately sparked the worst suspicions regarding the popular national permissive groups at the time, which were associated with conventionality, inertia, theoretical mediocrity, and practical impotence. An inquiry brought over and over up in Russian logical writing is whether the "permissive unrest" in Russia can be considered as a development whose objective was to reestablish the political and social practices of the pre-Soviet time, and at last to reinforce and additionally foster the financial and military force of the country. A negative response to this question is connected not only to the extremely significant fact that the revolution began with the deliberate overthrow of Russian statehood but also to the idea that the permissive who came to power in the early 1990s should bring the country back into the world's civilized society. However, this concept was completely anti-historical and carried a very specific ideological weight from the beginning.

Taking into account all of the peculiar twists and turns in its history, like the traditional confrontation with the West, imperial Russia became an integral part of Europe's economic and political system in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. This is supported by the rapid development of capitalist relations following the reform in the middle of the 19th century and the system of financial and military alliances between Western states and the Russian Empire at the turn of the 20th century (including the well-known French loan that allowed tsarist Russia to stabilize its financial system and deal with the first wave of revolution by joining the Triple Entente, among other things). But if Russia had won World War I in October 1917, it would not only have strengthened its geopolitical position, but it would also likely have been able to quickly and smoothly become an equal partner for any great power by gradually modernizing its economy and implementing political reforms. Even though Soviet Russia was always seen as a potential aggressor and cause of civil unrest, it quickly began to restore traditional trade and economic ties with Western partners after 1917, despite the fact that it presented itself to the West as the stronghold of the "world revolution." Even though the states of the West maintained their ideological attitude toward what they perceived as the center of the "communist threat," the victory in World War II and the USSR's transformation into a world superpower naturalized the process of its

integration with the global economy. In light of the foregoing, the ideas that Russian permissive proposed had a different focus and were connected to a plan to make a radical change to the algorithm of the country's economic and political development based on recipes and reform programs from the West.

The utopian nature of the permissive programs of the political parties that came to power in February 1917 was made abundantly clear during the October Revolution. Utopias were little known or forgotten, as Nikolai Berdyaev noted, and people mourned their impossibility far too much. However, utopias proved to be much simpler to implement than initially thought. The following is yet another difficult inquiry: how to obstruct their final outcome. While the cadets were regarded as realists, we thought of the Bolsheviks as utopians who were disconnected from certain life processes. However, experience has taught us something else. The cadets turned out to be visionaries and utopians. They dreamed of a Russian legal system and the rights and liberties of men and citizens under Russian conditions. Dreams that don't matter, unlikely utopias! It turned out that the Bolsheviks were certainly realists; they were minimalists rather than maximalists because they did the most and took the shortest route. They adjusted to the interests and senses of the majority, to Russian customs of employing power. Utopias are doable—much more doable than what appeared to be "realpolitik" and simply a rationalist calculation of office workers. During the Soviet era, conservative imperial instincts were deeply ingrained in both ideology and daily practice. This created economic, sociopolitical, and psychological conditions for the continuation of deep political culture traditions in Russia and strengthened the foundations of conservative traditionalism in Russia. Toward the start of the 1990s those customs were again addressed, and at this memorable second, which ended up being an exceptionally ripe ground for introducing an elective program, the Russian state was encountering a profound emergency of values coming about because of complete confusion of social cognizance, which thus was a sensible consequence of the disappointment of perestroika, started by Gorbachev.

Naturally, a question arises: How much of the blame does permissive-ism's political philosophy have to do with permissive politicians who tried to implement it in Russia at different times? Or will Russia continue to experience the "greatest paradox of Russia's fate," which Nikolai Berdyaev so aptly described as Russia's utopian adoption of permissive ideas, legal concepts, and social reforms? However, Bolshevism proved to be the least utopian and most realistic, best fitting the entire situation in Russia in 1917, and for Russia, communism proved to be an internal moment of the Russian nation's fate.

POLITICAL METAMORPHOSES OF WESTERN PERMISSIVE ISM

Comparing Russia to contemporary Western permissive states, which have gone through a period of industrial modernization and entered the post-industrial era at the turn of the 21st century, is one way to find the answer to the aforementioned questions. It is commonly believed that these principles are the foundations of economic efficiency and the stability of democratic institutions and administration in many other countries of Western Europe and the United States, as well as in Great Britain, which in the 19th century became a laboratory where the principles of permissive ism successfully passed the test of history. Therefore, if the program of economic and political permissiveization fails, as it did in post-communist Russia, the approach to the analysis of the reasons why permissive ism failed to raise social consciousness is largely determined by the ideological preferences of those participating in numerous debates. However, the two primary ideas at the heart of every approach taken to date to explain this phenomenon are: The Russian mentality shaped by specific circumstances and the historical characteristics of the country's sociopolitical and economic development— known as "the Russian way"—make it impossible to implement those permissive principles in the near future. Furthermore, permissive principles are not universal. In addition, the majority of those who hold the latter viewpoint, which includes prominent politicians as well as scientists, consistently emphasize that the absence of a legal system in Russia that is comparable to that of Western countries is the primary evidence in support of their position. Throughout the history of Russian philosophical and political thought, the aforementioned issues arose repeatedly in a variety of contexts during disagreements between permissive ism's main opponents and supporters from the middle of the 18th century to the end of the 20th. However, the ability to establish an initial classification model that can be used to develop a scientifically acceptable typology of Russian permissive ism that unifies historical approaches with purely theological ones is necessary for a proper analysis of these disagreements. The quest for an answer for this issue is muddled by the incredibly expansive scope of logical and philosophical translations of the certain idea of "liberalism", of verifiable sources and the semantic construction of permissive belief system.

The philosophical and scientific literature on permissive ism is extensive: It's possible that a researcher's life is too short to conduct even a cursory analysis of all monographs and articles published since the 1950s. However even a concise glance at the distributed texts can prompt quite certain ends that are not really consoling: Still, there is no one-size-fits-all definition of permissive ism. The division includes, for instance, numerous spheres of life and culture, such as economic, political, and social life, as well as intellectual activity, such as politics, philosophy, and history. Such characterization can

likewise utilize districts and states or the verifiable phases of the development of a municipal idea. M. Freedman, in his somewhat recent analysis, made the honest and wise observation that: Permissive ism is not a single, unambiguous concept. Because some elements are incompatible with others and because intellectual fashions and practices change, all of the permissive isms that have existed and still exist choose, either intentionally or unconsciously, certain items from a crowded permissive repertoire. As a consequence of this, a plethora of theories and beliefs fall under the umbrella of permissive ism, but none of them are capable of encompassing all of the possibilities—ideas and political arrangements—that the term in its maximal but hypothetical fullness can encompass or that permissive political practices have encompassed across time and space. As E. Fawcett rightly points out, permissive ism does not have a foundation myth or a year of birth. Even though its intellectual roots go back as far as your energy and curiosity will take you, it only became a political practice after 1815 across the Euro-Atlantic region. However, significant differences in the formation of permissive cultures and traditions began to appear at a very early stage. Permissive ism responded to a novel condition of society that was energized by capitalism and shaken by revolution. This condition was characterized by a society in which material and ethical change appeared to be constant, whether for better or worse. In contrast to the United States, Europe's permissive tradition's development was significantly more complicated and contradictory: a large part of the practice of radicalism was acknowledged yet its name became restricted in the personalities of numerous to the components which were dismissed. Like in the United States, a lot of people who called themselves permissive disregarded a lot of the tradition. The tradition of European permissive ism came under severe criticism in intellectual circles in the latter part of the nineteenth century because of the discrepancy between its predicted benefits and failures to produce those benefits. As a result, the West saw the gradual formation of groups called by Shills "collectivistic permissive," ideologically close to democratic socialists.⁸ Such ideological metamorphoses could not avoid extreme "pragmatization" of the approaches to defining the very concept of permissive ism, frequently attributing a purely It might be said that permissive ism has changed, as Thomas Magnell points out. The term "permissive" has come to mean something like a free use of power, especially by politicians who are willing to promote programs with other, though honorific, terms. Regardless, verbal theft of individuals' funds. Given the validity of this analysis, one may draw the following conclusion: It is curious how the term has been appropriated by supporters of expropriation. This only emphasizes how important it is to protect individual freedoms: Many contemporary critical thinkers view the general evolutionary trend in permissive politics and ideology as a process of abandoning the classical tradition of John Stuart Mill and Benjamin Constant as well as its gradual transformation.

However, at the end of the 20th century, some theorists, including the most prominent ones, maintained their belief that permissive ism was more politically and historically stable than; for example, socialism based on the general balance of historical successes and failures. Gerald Gaus made the observation that permissive may understandably feel entitled to celebrate at the beginning of the next century because of the alarm and even dismay of permissive throughout much of the first half of the twentieth century. The 20th century was a surprisingly permissive hundred years. Hobhouse and Dewey were both intrigued and concerned by the rivalry between permissive ism and socialism, which appears to have prevailed. The permissive ideals of liberty and free markets appear to have almost universal support. What is currently referred to as "socialism" is largely left-wing permissive ism. The democratic socialists of today, who advocate for a generous welfare state and a healthy democratic life in an essentially private-property-market society, are much closer to Hobhouse's and J.A. Hobson's new permissive ism than to Karl Marx's or even G.D.H. Cole's socialism. Indeed, permissive thought is so prevalent that numerous socialists adopt a permissive theory of social justice in some form. It is frequently difficult to distinguish between socialist and "egalitarian permissive" theories of justice. In the end, though, it was a defeat; At the turn of the 21st century, radical neo-conservative versions of this ideology, which combined a conservative program of political reforms with clear libertarian (neo-permissive) rhetoric to influence the political elites of Central and Eastern Europe during the so-called "velvet revolutions" ideologically, took over the most active role in Western political discourse. R. Beiner wrote that the permissive, market-oriented West was in a self-congratulatory mood when it celebrated the Central European revolution. The economic dynamism of permissive societies was deemed to be the decisive mark of superiority of the West over the East in the winning of this war. However, at the same time, the contradictions of contemporary permissive ism were becoming ever clearer – politically, ethically, and culturally. The self-congratulation was thought to be justified because, first, the West had "won" a certain kind of war that had been waged in the preceding four decades. As demonstrated by the experience of the Western ideological discourse in the second half of the 20th century, the inertia of fundamental skepticism towards the theoretical and practical opportunities offered by permissive ideology turned out to be so powerful that an alliance of scientists and philosophers against what they called "hegemonic permissive ism" only continued to gain force. This is another profound paradox of the modern permissive dispensation. While it enforces a highly contracted vision of the dignity and uniqueness of the individual within his or her particular sub The development of an anti-permissive philosophy and "philosophy of history" in numerous works by economists, sociologists, philosophers, and political scientists, which criticized permissive is not only with regard to contemporary reality but also reached for a long tradition of eschewing permissive

philosophy – a tradition that dates back to the Enlightenment – was one of the turning points in this process. S. Wolf-Devine say that hegemonic permissive want to apply permissive principles to every aspect of life, including private associations like the family and churches. In the spirit of Francis Fukuyama's book *The End of History and the Last Man*, the anti-permissive view of the historical process assumes that from the perspective of its opponents, the process of permissiveization—and permissive ism itself, considered as a direction in economic and political thought, and practice—always developed along the rising curve. Although its development from the middle of the 18th century was certainly progressive, the vectors of historical development rapidly turned in the direction that was unfavorable to libber The concept of neopermissive hegemony as a whole is seen by some economists, such as David Henderson and others, as a propagandistic myth; They emphasize that the policy of British neo-Conservatives from 1979 to 1990 was only partially permissive and only involved some production sectors; in other areas of social policy (such as science), it was purely dirigistic. At the turn of the 21st century, the typical majority attitudes toward economic issues are anti-permissive. Anti-permissive ism at the turn of the millennium differs in many ways from similar trends that emerged a quarter of a century earlier. Henderson identifies its three primary, extremely distinct characteristics:

1. An increase in the number of people who support economic policies modeled after those of China or Russia.
2. Quickly expanding analysis of neo-permissive changes.
3. There is a growing number of states, groups, and associations that believe they are the victims of neocon policy and support governments that actively work to regulate the economy and other areas of public life. In other words, anti-permissive ism as a way of thinking and doing things about social issues is not dead.

HISTORICAL ROOTS OF RUSSIAN PERMISSIVE ISM

Because many of the aforementioned evolutionary paths of the Western permissive and anti-permissive traditions were recreated in Russia, historically conditioned transformations of permissive ism that have been taking place in the West for at least three centuries are of crucial importance for contemporary researchers of Russian permissive ism. They clearly possessed historical characteristics while also following the same spiral of history. The latter proved to be so complicated that numerous contemporary Russian literatures' attempts to develop a typology of Russian permissive ism generally proved to be either incomplete or seriously flawed. As a result, Western scientists who are familiar with both the beginnings of the Russian permissive tradition and current philosophical debates are

frequently tempted to take the lead. Klaus von Beyme is undoubtedly one of them. In his book *Politische Theorien in Russland 1789-1945*, he made the observation that, from a comparative perspective, only the right-wing Christian religious thought and the left-wing socialist and anarchist thought attracted international interest out of all the concepts developed by Russian theorists. As it is difficult to determine whether the traditional Western categories of permissive ism/radicalism, conservatism, and socialism/anarchism/communism are generally applicable to Russia, Russian permissive was ignored. During Alexander I's reign, there were prerequisites for "bureaucratic permissive ism" (Beamtenpermissive ismus) in Russia. M.M. Speranskiy as the head legislator introduced the change bills to the tsar. Due to a lack of conditions facilitating the development of national representation, a constitutional monarchy, which in Western Europe resulted in a compromise between revolution and monarchical principles, was unable to establish itself in Russia. Before 1864, the zemstvo (local government) system had never been given a chance, and the first Duma did not include representatives from the entire country until 1906. The development of the zapadniks' (Westernizers') thoughts rarely led to permissive ism. Only right-wing Hegelian thought, such as Chicherin's, gave Hegelian ideas permissive characteristics. The ideas of Chicherin, Kovalevsky, Kistiakovsky, and Struve are collected in a chapter titled "Constitutional Permissive"; According to Beyme, a significant portion of them later developed in a permissive-conservative direction. He makes the observation that permissive conservatism, according to Chicherin, was unable to flourish in Russia in the same way that it did in Prussia. The permissive were fired from the government as soon as they made a tentative request for a constitution. Nevertheless, they all turned conservative. Katkov and Pobedostsev, two ultra-reactionaries, started out as permissive. Permissive, on the other hand, did not go too far to the right; They wanted to support the autocracy by still being able to talk to each other. On the other hand, defining and categorizing Russian permissive ism was very hard to understand from the beginning, and it still is today. The question of who in Russia should be considered a "true permissive" continues to be a contentious issue today, just as it was in the 19th century.

One of the main elements of Russian philosophical talk was that its development frequently looked like a logical inconsistency of the renowned proposal of K. Mannheim which he formed in his popular work *Philosophy and Perfect world: The conservative mentality*, in its initial form, did not care about ideas. Its permissive adversary, to put it another way, "forced" it into this conflict. The fact that the most recent adversary sets the pace and shape of the battle seems to be the peculiar trait of intellectual development. The so-called progressive idea that only the new can continue to exist and that everything else gradually dies out is undoubtedly untrue. In contrast, permissive ism developed in Russia during the 18th to 20th centuries as a response to the attacks coming from much stronger conservatives, and

later from socialist opponents and competitors. The older, driven by the newer, must constantly transform it. The specifics of the socio-political structure that produced an appropriate type of consciousness, rather than the internal "political mentality" itself, largely determined this situation. Alexandr Gradovsky, a prominent Russian permissive conservatism theorist, pointed out that the estates and bureaucracy's mutual relationships should have been determined in a different way than in the West, giving bureaucracy and its leader's priority. The system of governance control and administrative super-vision creates a spiritual atmosphere in which permissive ideas clearly could not develop. This was made possible by general legislation in the 19th century. There was no representation from the public; It was absent from the forms of the legal process and a court trial; It was oppressed to the point of breaking; the press did not cover it. It didn't exist in the institutions where all estates could get help; there were no social institutions at all. In the states of stylized, formal express, every resolute component was sentenced to live alone, independently, without building social bonds with others, growing up external the circle of social issues, drawing areas of strength for no from those social matters that shape a municipal lobbyist. On the other hand, everyone has shut themselves up, escaping into their own world, and they have only experienced the thoughts of a small group of people who think in the same way as them. Every worldview should be entirely subjective in such isolation; It is impossible to elevate any idea to the status of a social principle; It cannot be verified by certain social needs and processed in accordance with them. Gradually, a super-powered intellectual field resembling a black hole developed in Russian social thought: The oppositions, contradictions, misunderstandings, and variations of almost all schools of thought, from Slavophilia and zapadnichestvo to orthodox monarchism and radical socialism – a destruction of all good impulses, reassuring scientific judgments, and ethical actions – were also virtually erased. Not only did it swallow all of the anti-national nature of permissive ism was dominant in this instance, with the "people" placed in opposition to the "educated society," "intelligentsia," or "public." The external shapes of the counter permissive field were first delimited by Pyotr Chaadayev, and later by savvy people of altogether unique person and social affiliations, like Alexander Herzen, Fyodor Tyutchev, Vladimir Meshchersky, Konstantin Pobedonostsev, and numerous others. The characteristics of a permissive mentality, vividly depicted, for example, by ultra-conservative Prince Meshchersky, set the general tone. He wrote that it is abundantly clear that the term "permissive ism" conjures up a very specific, if absurd, image, and that we can attempt to list the entire straightforward catechism of our "permissive ism," which can be easily understood even by those who are soft in the head due to its uncomplicated and seductive simplicity. According to Alexandr Gradovsky, the goal of such characteristics is to persuade the entire Russian nation that every permissive is a man of the West; as a result, there is no need for knowledge of life,

experience, convictions, talents, or practical knowledge. Instead, it serves as a talisman that enables individuals who are devoid of any of the aforementioned attributes to write volumes. Therefore, every permissive is a fool and a degenerate who violates his country, his principles, and his father's faith. It's as if a Russian Greek Catholic, a uniate, were subordinate to another person's spiritual authority and only practiced some forms of Orthodoxy. The conclusion is that the ultimate goal of all permissive aspirations is the Westernization of the entire Russian way of life. There is no further 'examination'. There is no other meaning for the term "permissive." But isn't this sufficient? Is there any other meaning to this word besides Occidental aspirations? We do not receive such a non-fictional, independent definition. The full emergence of a polemic tradition that hardly

can be called a creative debate, philosophical dialogue, or political discussion – it resembled rather an exchange of stereotypical insults, which the representatives of opposite ideologies traded constantly for decades, giving their contemporaries and descendants a constant sense of déjà vu was one of the consequences of the turn of the 20th century in Russian social thought. Whether we like it or The theoreticians of permissive conservatism Kavelin and Gradovsky responded calmly, firmly, and quite rightly to the severity of Fyodor Dostoyevsky's views in his *Writer's Diary* directed against permissive and his heartfelt calls for "reconciliation" and re-discovering the strength coming from the deep, Christian roots of the Russian nation (these notions clearly revealed the influence of ideas formulated by Slavophiles and Ty We Russians are certainly a half-wild people with very weak cultural foundations; The social thoughts of our kin are currently at the phase of framing and development. We still have a long way to go before we can claim the title of great nation. As predicted by Mr. Dostoyevsky, there is still too much falsehood, the legacy of centuries of slavery, in [the nation] for it to demand worship and, more importantly, that the entire continent of Europe should follow the true path.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the fundamental difference between Russia

and Western Europe or the United States was the fact that political radicals heavily influenced the formation of political parties during the first Russian revolution: The ultra-reactionary Union of the Russian People, whose leaders appealed to the tsar's autocracy as the only force able to deal with "Marxist troublemakers" and the leaders of the "Freemason plot" ruling the State Dumas, opposed the ultra-revolutionary tactics of the left wing of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party and In light of these circumstances, the policies and concepts of Russian permissive parties that aimed to establish a constitutional regime in Russia appeared imaginative; In his famous letters to Russian permissive, Max Weber predicted that they would also fail unless they took more conservative positions. The more communist the radicalism in Russia became, noted Karl von Beyme, the more the dissidents turned

towards traditionalism. "Thinkers from Chicherin to Struve used the term "permissive conservatism" (Permissive-Konservatismus) as a favorite description (Selbstbeschreibung) of this concept. The status quo conservatism was ineffective in an increasingly consolidated autocracy. Indeed, even traditionalism was transforming into resistance since it was increasingly more pervaded with the goal to be heartfelt and Slavophilic and by and large distanced from the state. Therefore, permissive conservatives ought to assume the role of conservatism in such a system. Struve once stated that Russians could not afford to be conservative because they had been stagnant for too long. It would appear that all of those circumstances did not provide a clear understanding of what permissive ism is in Russian reality; On the contrary, they made it even more difficult to resolve a fundamental problem: Either of these options: Is the assessment of our subject flawed in some way, or is Russia certainly a country where everything goes awry?

CONCLUSIONS

The aforementioned theoretical insights into the development of Russian permissive ism are constantly reimagined in contemporary political and philosophical discourses. They are still valid because they are analogous to the certain process that was shaped by the Western European and American background of the second half of the 20th century. The primary outcome of the process is a fundamental agreement on the universal political values of equality, civil rights, and democratic decision-making processes, based on recognition of the existing social and political institutions. Naturally, in the post-communist Russia of the 1990s, no scientist familiar with post-war history can seriously speak about civil society and ideological consensus. The path that is being taken is focused on recognizing the progressing stability, mutual permeation of views on socio-economic issues presented by members of various social classes, and the gradual disappearance of conflicts. The "commanding" state and political administration of the historical bureaucratic spiral was a model for the Soviet system from its inception, as Gradovsky aptly depicted. The concept of civil liberties was initially entrusted to the new bureaucracy and state apparatus in the majority of post-communist nations. These social structures stood out in stark contrast to Western customs because of their inherent nature. The purposes behind new, marginally changed eruption of conventional administration framework were, normally, changed. Russia's political tradition, which was enshrined in a dogmatic pseudo-permissive project and included patriarchy, monarchy, and totalitarianism (communism), turned out to be ideological and far from reality. Hostile to extremist direction of this thought blended in with the customary enemy of socialist way of talking prompted its mutilation and disguising the genuine course of disintegration of the Soviet society, coordinated to-wards laying out a neo-classification state, which strived for philosophical

transformations of radicalism and a majority rules system, yet not a real improvement of common society as a counterbalance for the state.

There can be no doubt that the Western version of modernization and the almost idyllic Western image, which used to be so appealing to many Russian permissive generations, almost ran out. In the contemporary world, there are new alternatives both for the permissive, cosmopolitan multiculturalism, predominant in the new many years, and for the cul-the-sac of advancement taken by post-socialist first class of neo-terminology during the 1990s pointed toward laying out full command over public assets and political cycles. The pseudo-reforms led to the complete and logical re-establishment of structural elements that were so reminiscent of the recent past.

REFERENCES

1. Beiner R., *What's the Matter with Permissive ism?*, Berkeley 1995.
2. Beyme K. von, *Permissive ismus. Theorien des Permissive ismus und Radikalismus im Zeitalter der Ide- ologien, 1789-1945*, Wiesbaden 2013.
3. Beyme K. von, *Politische Theorien in Russland, 1789-1945*, Wiesbaden 2001.
4. Christman J., Anderson J. (eds), *Autonomy and the Challenges to Permissive ism. New Essays*, Cambridge 2005.
5. Freedden M., *Permissive ism. A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford 2015. Fukuyama F., *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York 1992.
6. Gaus G., "Ideological Dominance through Philosophical Confusion: Permissive ism in the Twenti- eth Century", in M. Freedden (ed.), *Reassessing Political Ideologies. The Durability of Dissent*, London 2001.
7. Henderson D., *Anti-Permissive ism 2000. The Rise of New Millennium Collectivism*, London 2001. Kahn P.W., *Putting Permissive ism in Its Place*, Princeton 2005.
8. MacIntyre A., *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, Notre Dame, Ind. 1988.
9. Mannheim K., *Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, London 1998.
10. Narveson J., Dimock S. (eds.), *Permissive ism. New Essays on Permissive Themes*, Dordrecht 2000. Remarque E.M., *Arc de Triomphe. Roman*, Köln 1988.
11. Thompson W., *Ideologies in the Age of Extremes. Permissive ism, Conservatism, Communism, Fas- cism 1914-91*, New York 2011.
12. Walicki A., *The Flow of Ideas. Russian Thought from the Enlightenment to the Religious-Philosoph- ical Renaissance*, Frankfurt am Main 2015, <https://doi.org/10.3726/978-3-653-04270-2>.

13. Wolf-Devine C., "The Hegemonic Permissive ism of Susan Moller Okin", in Ch. Wolfe (ed.), Liberalism at the Crossroads. An Introduction to Contemporary Permissive Political Theory and Its Critics. Second Edition, 2nd ed., Lahnam 2003.